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I. INTRODUCTION
After years of political and economic conflict between the United States and
Iran, a movement toward improving relations between these two countries has
* .D., University of the Pacific, McCeorge School of Law, to be conferred 2000; B.S., Physiology &
Psychology, University of California, Davis, 1996. With much appreciation to MSV for all her love, patience and
support. Additionally, I would like to extend gratitude to my parents, friends and the McGeorge faculty who made
completing this comment possible.
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recently arisen! As relations between Iran and the United States strengthen, the
potential for business investment planning in Iran continues to grow for an
international practitioner.2 In order to adequately counsel her client on investments
in Iran, a practitioner must be able to reasonably predict the legal outcome of a
transnational dispute arising from an investment in Iran. This Comment provides
such a basis for planning a transnational agreement.
This Comment provides a foundation for a legal practitioner who is considering
plans for commercial transactions with foreign countries where no applicable case
law, treaty, or convention currently exists. Iran is used as a model for this analysis,
due to its rich and turbulent history with the United States3 and the significant case
law resulting from the hundreds of cases heard before the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal.4 Further, the recent developments in Iran calling for improved relations
between the United States and Iran provide additional information for the analysis.5
Although Iran is discussed, the analysis provided in this Comment may be
applicable to a transaction with any country or region where no prior law has
developed between those two nations.
1. See John Daniszeweski, Iranians Want U.S. To Help Them Pursue Happiness Persian Gulf: Amid
Staglafion, Many See Renewed Ties withAmerica as Key to Growth and More Freedom, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6,1998,
at A6 (stating that many citizens of Iran are hopeful that Iran's new President, Mr. Khatami, will succeed in
bringing more freedom to Iran and improve economic relations with the West). But see Daniel Pearl, Rial Problems:
Where Brad Pitt Is Hot and Shoe Sales Aren't: Iran and Its Discontents, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1998, at Al
(suggesting that many conservative Iranian economic advisors and cabinet members are still suspicious of the
West's intention); see also Elaine Sciolino, Iranian President Says U.S. Must Alter Policies If Talks Are To Begin,
HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 23, 1998, at 24 (proclaiming that U.S. must take concrete steps in changing its policy
toward Iran before relations can improve).
2. See Political Outlook, MEED QUARTERLY REPORT, June 1, 1998, at 3 (noting that Iran-U.S. business
dealings have evolved while foreign relations between the two countries have undergone considerable
transformations in recent months); see also Stephen J. Glain, Foreign-Currency Shortage Hobbles Iran: Overseas
Investors Find Tehran Can't Finance Big Deals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1998, at A14 (indicating that Iran is in
desperate need of several goods and services including: spare machine parts to support its agricultural industry,
tools, and luxury items).
3. See infra notes 17-79 and accompanying text (discussing the extensive investment history of the United
States in Iran, the subsequent Iranian Revolution, and the attempts to resolve disputes arising from the uprising by
creating the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal).
4. See David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure
ofInternational Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1990) (claiming that some believe that the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal is the most vital body of arbitration law in history and is an invaluable source to attorneys); see
also CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRuEscHKE, THE IRAN-UNrIED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 658 (1998)
(explaining how the Tribunal is the largest international tribunal in history responsible for resolving claims between
a Western and non-Western country).
5. See Pearl, supra note I (advocating new relations between Iran and the United States); see also Clinton
Reinforces Albright's Friendly Overture to Iran: President Says United States is Seeking Genuine Reconciliation
and Exploring Whatthe Future Might Hold, GLOBE&MAtL, June 19,1998, at A14 [hereinafter Clinton Reinforces
Albright's Friendly Overture] (detailing President Clinton's belief that Iran was changing for the better perhaps
leading to improved relations with the United States in the future); see also China: West Offers Olive Branch to
Iran, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 1,1998 (indicating that French President Jacques Chirac extended an invitation to Iranian
President Khatami to visit France); see also Clinton: Let's Renew Friendship With Iran, ORLANDO SENTDL, June
19, 1998, at A8 (urging Iran to cooperate in plans leading to reconciliation between the two countries).
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Accordingly, this Comment intends to provide a general basis for relevant and
practical considerations made when planning such a transaction. Since the stability
and background of a region are important to a transnational investment, Section II
begins by discussing the extensive economic history between the United States and
Iran during the 1960s and 70s,6 and the events leading up to the taking of U.S.
hostages in the American Embassy in Iran in 1979.' Section I is further divided
into two segments: the first discusses the formation of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal created to resolve disputes arising from the events prior and subsequent
to the 1979 Hostage Crises,' and the second segment discusses the current state of
U.S. and Iran relations as demonstrated through the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996 (I.L.S.A.) which officially prohibits large scale investments in Iran until
2001. Section III explains how relations between the U.S. and Iran have improved
in recent months,10 which potentially will result in a surge of investment
opportunities in Iran." Section IV continues by analyzing the case law of the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal as a basis for planning these new transactions in Iran. Section
V explains how other factors, including the ability to obtain adequate financing and
insurance, are relevant in planning a successful business agreement.12 Finally,
Section VI concludes by offering a brief summary of the practicality of using this
large body of case law developed by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as a basis for
drafting international transactions.
6. See infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text (describing the extent of U.S. investment in Iran in the
1960s and 1970s).
7. See infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text (establishing what circumstances and conditions led up
to the taking of the U.S. hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran).
8. See infra notes 5 1-79 and accompanying text (noting that to resolve the international dispute, the United
States and Iran signed the Algiers Accords which contained a provision for establishing the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal to settle all disputes between the two countries).
9. See infia notes 53-109 and accompanying text (explaining how relations between Iran and the United
States remained severed during the duration of the Tribunal and how Congress reacted by enacting a statute
purporting to impose sanctions on any natural person or corporation doing business with Iran); see also Margarete
McQuaile & Maureh Lorenzetti, Europe Seeks End to Broader Sanctions Issue, PLATr's OILGRAM NEWS, May 19,
1998, at I at I (noting that .L.S.A. has a five year sunset legislation with an expiration date on August 5, 2001,
unless Congress decides to renew it).
10. See Clinton Reinforces Albright's Friendly Overture, supra note 5.
11. See Glain. supra note 2 (suggesting Iran's need for investment and economic growth may have been
the impetus for Iran's attempt to restore economic ties with the West); see also Daniszeweski, supra note 1, at A6
(delineating how political changes in Iran will potentially encourage foreign businesses to invest in Iran due to
Iran's promotion of a less restrictive environment toward foreigners).
12. See infia notes 242-98 and accompanying text (describing how Iran was unsuccessful in providing
adequate financing and insurance to foreign investors resulting in Sovereign nations being forced to supply it
themselves).
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II. BACKGROUND
The success of any investment is based primarily upon the stability of the
particular market.13 It is crucial for a practitioner or investment consultant to be
thoroughly familiar with the region where the investment is to take place. 14 This
includes the economic and political background of the region, the stability and
extent of that country's foreign relations with other governments, and the legal
history between the host and foreign nation. 5 These factors taken as a whole may
be the initial consideration taken by an investor before proceeding with the
transaction. Accordingly, the following section discusses the precarious relationship
between the United States and Iran during the past thirty years of history between
the two countries. 6
A. Culmination of the American Embassy Hostage Crises
In the 1960s and early 1970s, Iran began a nationwide program supporting
economic and military growth.17 During this process, the Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran
("Shah"),18 commissioned the development of Iran's military power by supporting
the purchase of large volumes of military equipment. 19 The Shah also endorsed
complete renovation of Iran's economic infrastructure by promoting port facilities,
road construction projects, new factories, and the purchase of computer equipment
to modernize Iranian businesses.2 To fund its new programs and to continue
development, Iran actively sought foreign investment from Western countries, with
the United States as its primary target investor.2' At the same time, Iran sought
foreign employees to train, build, and advise Iran on establishing new factories and
13. See RICHARD EISENBERG, THE MONEY BOOK OF PERSONAL FINANCE 414 (1996) (suggesting that a
historical analysis is highly relevant to a sound investment).
14. See id. at 188 (indicating that an attorney hired should be familiar with local customs before
commencing a transaction).
15. See infra notes 17-109 and accompanying text (discussing the history of Iran during the last three
decades and the resultant relationship that history has had on U.S.-Iran relations).
16. See id.
17. See BROWER& BRUESCHKEsupra note 4, at 3 (explaining Iran's desire to diversify its economy beyond
its virtual dependence on oil revenue).
18. See WAYNE MAPP, THE IRAN-UNI ES STT7ES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: THE FIRSr iE YEARS, 1981-1991,
at 3 (Gillian M. White ed.) (1993) (implying that the name Shah was the generic title for the ruler of Iran).
19. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 3 (describing how the Shah proclaimed Iran to be the
region's military power and purchased large volumes of military equipment in efforts toward meeting these
assertions).
20. See id. (indicating that this renovation, along with military expenditures, were the result of Iran's newly
acquired oil revenue).
21. See iaL (claiming that by the late 1970s expenditures by American Corporations involved in Iran totaled
in the billions of dollars); see also MAPI, supra note 18, at 3 n.l (stating that trade between the United States and
Irn increased by over 1,500% from 1970 to 1978).
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businesses. 2 Growth and progress in Iran continued to skyrocket as oil prices
increased during the 1973 oil embargo.23 As a result of Iran's economic growth
during thel960s and early 1970s, over 45,000 American's conducted business in
Iran and were parties to private and government business ventures by 1978.2 As an
unforseen consequence of the Shah's plan for Iranian economic reform, the large
foreign population of investors and employees in Iran created disenchantment
among large segments of the Iranian population.2
Iranian nationals were discontent with both the large western population in Iran
and the fact that the Shah of Iran encouraged foreign investment.' Fundamental
religious groups headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the foreign
population in Iran would corrupt strictly held Islamic beliefs resulting in the moral
decay of Iranian society.27 Blaming the Shah for public discontent, the Ayatollah
began a movement calling for the expulsion of foreigners from Iran and the
redirection of governmental control.28 An Islamic Revolution, beginning in late
1978, ensued to effectuate the Ayatollah's new policy which targeted foreigners in
Iran. By early 1979, the Shah left Iran with the aid of the United States, 3° further
inflaming the Revolutionary factions opposed to the Shah's past foreign and
economic policies.31 At the same time, most business contracts between the United
States and Iran were disrupted by either American abandonmene 2 or Revolutionary
compulsion.33 Foreign nationals conducting business in Iran hastily left the country
leaving their businesses and dominion over them behind.34
22. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 4.
23. See id. (detailing the fact that in 1973 the price of oil quadrupled which Iran duly utilized to fund the
development of its country).
24. See MAPP, supra note 18, at 3 (discussing that these included American military advisors, engineers and
advisory personnel and their families).
25. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 4 (suggesting that, primarily, religious fundamentalists
were opposed to the foreign presence in Iran).
26. See id.
27. See d. (suggesting that religious leaders believed that American economic and military influenceinIran
was the source of the Shah's power and the root of the Iranian cultural difficulties).
28. See MAPP, supra note 18, at 3 (noting that the Shah was believed to be to blame for the relationship
between the Imperial Iranian government and the United States).
29. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 4; see also MAP, supra note 18, at 3 (setting forth that
only 2,000 Americans remained in Iran by January 1979 as a result of the hostility directed against them).
30. SeeBRowER&BRUESCHKEsupra note4, at4n.2 (indicating thatAmericaprovidedpassagetoth Shah
purportedly for the purpose of dire medical treatment).
31. See MAPP, supra note 18, at 5 (describing the detention of personnel from the United States Embassy).
32. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that duringthe culmination of the revolution
many American business personnel left Iran voluntarily).
33. See MAPP, supra note 18, at 3 (maintaining that several of the departing Americans were compelled to
abandon their businesses and property by the newly formed Revolutionary Guards).
34. See BROWER& BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 4.
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Immediately following the foreign nationals' departure from Iran, U.S.
companies attempted to negotiate with Iran's new government35 aiming to collect
payment for past contractual performance. 36 After negotiations with Iran generally
failed, many U.S. businesses attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to collect payment
for contractual performance from Iran by filing actions for breach of contract in
U.S. courts.37 It was the goal of these companies to obtain judgments in U.S. courts
and levy Iranian assets which were already being held in U.S. banks." Additionally,
several of the claimants were allowed pre-judgement attachments of Iranian
property located in the United States39 However, prior tojudgement, all claims filed
in the United States were dismissed by an Executive Order from President Jimmy
Carter.4
For the next several months, hostilities between Iran and the United States
continued to rise.41 On November 4, 1979, in protest of U.S. facilitation of the
Shah's departure from Iran, Iranian militants entered the U.S. embassy in Tehran,
Iran and took sixty-one U.S. diplomats hostage, as well as diplomats from other
countries.42 Iranian militants demanded that the United States return the Shah to
Iran, along with his assets, so that they could deal with him accordingly.43 As the
hostage crises continued and after Iran publicly proclaimed that they would
withdraw all Iranian funds from U.S. banks, President Carter ordered Iranian assets
frozen in U.S. banks.M Over $12 billion in Iranian assets held in U.S. banks were
35. See iU. (stating that Iran's new government was declared by the Islamic Revolutionaries to be called the
Islamic Republic of Iran).
36. See id.
37. See MAP, supra note 18, at 5 (specifying that all claims were dismissed once the United States provided
for an alternate forum for dispute resolution through the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal established pursuant to the
Algiers Accords).
38. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,655 (1981) (detailing how claimants contended that they
were entitled to just compensation for their claims under the Fifth Amendment).
39. SeeElectronic Data Systems v. Social Security Organization of Iran, 651 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1981) and
Behring International Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.C.NJ.) (1979) (finding in two cases
where the court held that a prejudgement attachment was constitutional). But see Reading & Bates Corporation v.
National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that prejudgement attachment was barred
because of Iran's sovereign immunity).
40. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 655 (holding that if settlement or suspension of claims are necessary
and incident to the resolution of a major foreign dispute and Congress had implicitly acquiesced in that type of
Presidential action, then the action will be deemed to be within Presidential authority); see also MAPe, supra note
18, at 5 (indicating that when the hostage crises was resolved, all U.S. courts actions were dismissed pursuant to
Executive Order No. 12294).
41. See BROWER & BRutscHK. supra note 4, at 4 (describing public discontent aimed at foreigners present
in Iran, especially Americans).
42. See MAP?, supra note 18, at 5 (detailing how Iranian militants took sixty-one U.S. Diplomats hostage,
as well as, the senior U.S. official in Iran, the Charge d' Affaires, and two other foreign diplomats).
43. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 4.
44. See id. at 4-5 (relating Iran's intention to withdraw its funds from U.S. banks and to repudiate all
financial obligations to U.S. Nationals); see also MAP, supra note 18, at 6 (suggesting that Iran desired to damage
U.S. financial interests by withdrawing its assets from U.S. Banks. as indicated by then Iranian Foreign Minister,
Mr. Banisadr).
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affected. 5 Incident to the President's order, U.S. courts were directed not to enter
any judgements against Iranian property or assets until the hostage crises was
resolved and the hostages were safely returned to the United States
46
To effectuate this policy, the Iranian Assets Control Regulations47 were
promulgated under the International Economic Powers Act to give Congressional
authority to the President's executive power.' Several months later, and after a
failed rescue attempt,49 Iran and the United States negotiated for the release of the
hostages in exchange for release of Iranian assets. After the crises ended on
January 19, 1981, the United States and Iran signed the Algiers Accords which
included a provision for the establishment of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.5t
Central to the Algiers Accords was a preamble that recognized the inability of the
United States and the Iranian government to amicably deal directly with one another
and a covenant to resolve their differences in good faith through the Tribunal.52
B. The Creation of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
To accomplish the objectives underlying the Algiers Accords, the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal was created to hear both inter-governmental and private party-state
claims that arose prior to January 198 1. Once the Algiers Accords was signed and
ratified by the United States and Iran, US$8.1 billion held by U.S. banks was
transferred to Iranian escrow accounts.54 These funds were then transferred by
Algerian escrow agents to U.S. accounts in order to repay Iranian loans made by
45. See Paul G. Gaston, Iran-United States Litigation, 77 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. 3 (1983) (stating that prior
to the revolution, Iran had over $12 billion assets in U.S. owned banks).
46. See 31 C.F.R. § 535.504 (b)(1) (1980); see also BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 6 (indicating
that United Stated Department of Justice also requested that no action be taken pending resolution of the hostage
crises).
47. See id.
48. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 5 n.5 (citing International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701) (Supp. 1I 1979).
49. See MAPP, supra note 18, at 10 (addressing the military efforts to free the hostages involving several
aircraft, helicopters, and over one-hundred military personnel).
50. See id. at 12 (indicating that Iranian Parliament established the Majlis resolution, which provided that
the American Hostages would only be released as a result of lifting of the freeze on Iranian assets, as well as other
conditions).
51. See id. at 14 (explaining how the Algiers Accord was established to resolve all claims between the
United States and Iran and to attempt to restore relations between the two countries to a condition prior to that of
the revolution).
52. See id at 14-15 (citing General Principal B of the General Declaration suggesting that the United States
would not interfere in Iran's internal affairs).
53. See MAPP, supra note 18, at 14 (establishing the role of the Tribunal to resolve all major legal problems
arising from contractual or property disputes between the United States and Iran occurring as a result of the Islamic
Revolution).
54. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 7-8 n.19 (adding that other assets were released
subsequently to Iran).
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U.S. banks.55 Of the remaining assets held, US$1 billion was kept in U.S. banks in
a special security account as a fund for payments for Americans' successful claims
as determined by the Tribunal.' The remaining funds needed to settle the claims
were placed into the security account by Iran, with all interest accruing on the
account continuing to be Iranian propertyY
The Tribunal, which hears these claims consists of nine members." The nine
members are organized into three chambers of three arbitrators, each with an
Iranian, American, and a Swedish or French party as a panel member.5 9 The
Tribunal Claims Settlement Declaration provides that the United Nations
Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules of procedure shall
govern the claims unless modified by either the United States and Iran, or by the
entire panel.60 The UNCITRAL rules are the culmination of over forty years of
attempts by the United Nations to produce an international set of rules of
arbitration.61 These rules are intended to bring about the settlement and termination
of all claims through binding arbitration between parties from Iran and the United
States62
Many of the Tribunal's interpretations of UNCITRAL have resulted in
improvements or clarifications of UNCITRAL, which would have taken the
International Community several decades to elucidate in the normal course of
commercial arbitration. 63 The revisions to UNCITRAL include such broad areas as
evidence, hearings, applicable law, representation, and mechanisms for final
55. See id. at 5 n.5 (citing P.D. TROOBOFF, IMLEMENATION OF THE IRANIAN sEI.LEMENT AGREEMENT-
STATUS, ISSUES, AND LESSONS: VIEW FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR'S PERSPECTIVE IN PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 114-15) (M.L. Landwehr, ed. 1981) (explaining how
US$5.5 billion was transferred to the Central Bank of Algiers of which US$3.7 billion was later transferred to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
56. See BROWER &BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that the US$1 billion was not a maximum limit
but would be replenished by Iran as needed to cover American awards).
57. See iL (proclaiming that the assets were to be applied toward Iranian liability as determined by the
Tribunal).
58. See id. at 10.
59. See id (emphasizing that the Claims Settlement Declaration does not mandate that the third panel
member be from a country other than the United States or Iran, however, all such members have been from a third
country).
60. See i. at 17 (discussing that minor modifications were made in establishing the Final Tribunal Rules
of Procedure); see also MAPP, supra note 18, at 29.
61. See MAPPsupra note 18, at42 (stating how UNCITRAL rules were finally promulgated in 1976 by the
United Nations).
62. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 8 (outlining that the general purpose of the Tribunal was
to terminate all litigation as between the government of each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about
the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration).
63. See Caron, supra note 4, at 156 n.3 (citing HoWARD M. HOLZMANN, SOME LESSONS OF THE IRAN-
UNrrED STATES CLAIMS RImUNALIN PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
BusINEss (L.M. Landwehr, ed. 1988) (postulating that the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has interpreted, applied, and
supplemented the UNCITRAL rules).
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awards.64 As a result, the UNCITRAL rules, as a model code for commercial
arbitration procedure, have gained greater acceptance in conducting international
acceptance.'
Despite the application of the UNC1TRAL rules and the goal to resolve all
disputes quickly, the Tribunal could not hear any case unless the Tribunal first
acquired jurisdiction over the parties and their claims.' Each party heard before the
Tribunal has the burden to allege and establish the Tribunal's jurisdiction over that
party.67 Parties with dual nationality of Iranian and U.S. citizenship are not
considered by Iran to be under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal unless the party's
dominant nationality was U.S. prior to January 1981. 68 The Tribunal also requires
that corporate nationality be established by having at least fifty percent of
shareholders be of U.S. citizenship.69 Parties who are Iranian nationals alone cannot
bring a claim before the Tribunal, but may use other mediums and local courts to
resolve their disputes against the Iranian government.70
In addition to establishing personal jurisdiction, the Tribunal requires that
claimants establish subject matterjurisdiction.7 1 The Tribunal will only hear claims
that arise out of debts, contracts, expropriations or other measures affecting
property rights.72 Claims for morality violations, mental anguish, pain and suffering,
and personal injury73 fall outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal.74
The Tribunal has also made clear that counterclaims are within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal as long as the claim arose from the same transaction or occurrence of
the original national's claim.75 The Tribunal requires that to be heard, despite
establishing personal or subject matterjurisdiction, outstanding claims must be filed
64. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 19 (outlining the expansive body of Tribunal case law
developing application of UNCITRAL procedure).
65. See id
66. See MAPP, supra note 18, at 14 (indicating that the Tribunal cannot hear a claim from anyone who is not
either an Iranian or American citizen).
67. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE. supra note 4, at 29 (detailing the Tribunal's inability to hear any claim if
the claimant had not yet established jurisdiction).
68. See id. at 32 (consideration of dominant nationality involves "all relevant factors including habitual
residence, center of interests, family ties, participation in public life and other evidence of association to a country
or region").
69. See id at 42.
70. See id at 32.
71. Claims Settlement Declaration, art. 1I, para. 1, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep., at 9; see also Claims
Settlement Declaration, art I, para. 4, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep., at 10.
72. See MAPP, supra note 18, at 114 (clarifying that the terms of "other measures affecting property rights"
has been used by the Tribunal to grant jurisdiction when no other theories of recovery are available).
73. See Futura Trading Incorporated v. National Iranian Oil Company, 13 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 99, at
64 (1986) (stating that considerations of morality are outside the scope of the Tribunal).
74. See BROWER&BRUESCHKE supra note 4, at 59-60 (concluding that other measures shall be interpreted
in the context of contracts and debts only).
75. See id at 99.
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prior to January 19, 1982, one year from the date that the Tribunal was formed. 6
Debts arising prior to January 19, 1981, whether or not demanded after that date,
are considered outstanding debts by the Tribunal.' Despite the thousands of cases
heard by the Tribunal in its attempts to amicably resolve disputes between the
United States and Iran, diplomatic relations between the two countries remained
strained.78 The next decade, following the formation of the Tribunal, was filled with
mistrust, suspicion, and animosity between the two countries.
C. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
On August 5, 1996, Congress enacted the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
(I.L.S.A.). ° I.L.S.A. authorizes the President to sanction any natural person or
business entity that invests an aggregate of US$40 million or more in either Libya
or Iran, or US$10 million within a twelve month period, if that investment
contributes to the development of that country's petroleum resources.8 '
Additionally, I.L.S.A. has accorded the President with authority to further reduce
the total investment to US$5 million in any year, with an aggregate total investment
of US$20 million. 2 I.L.S.A. expressly prohibits foreign investment of goods,
services, and technology, as well as military supplies and oil refining equipment. 3
Congress enacted I.L.S.A. based on its belief that Iran and Libya were the largest
supporters of international terrorism which threatened national and foreign security
76. Id at 86 (discussing that no claim could be filed six months after the President was appointed or one
year from the establishment of the Tribunal). But see id. at 86 n.386 (citing Claim of United Technologies
International Inc. 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 5 (detailing how a claimant was allowed to amend a claim after the
deadline date with a timely, previously filed claim).
77. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
122, at 31 (1991) (finding jurisdiction over a debt arising in 1975 even though a claim was not made until after
January 19, 1981).
78. See BRoWER & BRUEsCHKE, supr note 4, at 19 (relations between Iran and the United States remained
severed throughout the history of the Tribunal).
79. See id
80. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172,110 Stat. 1541 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1701) (West Supp. 1997).
81. See id. §§ 5(a), (b)(2); see also Michael A. Asaro, The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996A Thorn
in the Side of World Trading, 23 BROOKLYNJ. INT'LL. 505,506 (1997) (implying that all investments will be used
to develop petroleum resources in Iran and Libya, which will in turn be used to fund extremist groups in these
countries, ultimately leading to international terrorism).
82. See Marc C. Herbert, Unilateralism as a Defense Mechanism: An Overview of the Iran and Libyan
Sanctions Act of 1996, 5 Y.B. INT'LL. 1, 6 (1996-97) (stating that the President must request that Congress impose
further restrictions on Iran if itis found that Iran is still obtaining sufficient funds to support international terrorism).
But see 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (indicating that the President may grant a waiver of sanctions to any national of any
country if that party has agreed to take substantial measures toward suppressing Iran's ability to support weapons
of mass destruction and international terrorism).
83. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701,2(2), 5(b)(l). But see id. (explaining that, in some respects, Iran and Libya are
treated differently under I.L.S.A. due to their distinct economic histories).
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interests.s4 By restricting investment in Iran, Congress intimated that Iran and Libya
would be denied the ability to develop petroleum resources which would, in turn,
further constrain their ability to support acts of international terrorism.s
Congress' goal to curb investment in Iran pursuant to I.L.S.A. did not stop at
U.S. boundaries.s" Rather, Congress had expectations of preventing all European
and Asian investment in Iran by threatening financial penalties and sanctions on
foreign investors doing business with Iran.87 The immediate response from the
international community was one of outrage espousing that hegemonic dictations
over their sovereign nations would not be tolerated.s' Several members of the
European Union (EU), including, Italy, Germany, and France further condemned
I.L.S.A. as a primary boycott against Iran and Libya, and a secondary boycott
against the EU. 9 The realization that Iran was a primary arena for investment led
many European and Asian companies to flock to Iran despite threats governed by
I.L.S.A.9 Within months after I.L.S.A. was enacted, several foreign businesses
entered into various transactions with Iran in clear defiance of the U.S. threatened
sanctions.9 The United States circuitously responded by affirming their
commitment to I.L.S.A. while still declining to impose sanctions because of their
84. See Richard G. Alexander, Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 Congress Exceeds Its Jurisdiction to
Prescribe Law, 54 WASH. &LEEL. REV. 1601(1997) (suggesting that the justification for the enactment of LL.S.A.
was rooted in U.S. security interest because of U.S. belief that it was a prime target of international terrorism).
85. See Alexander, supra note 84, at 1612 n.67 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-523 (1996) and explaining that
Congress believed that the Act would decrease currency resulting in Iranian inability to repay its national debt).
86. See 110 Stat. 1551 § 14 (A)-(C) (outlining how I.LS.A. broadly applies to any natural person,
corporation, business association, societies, trusts, or non-governmental business entity). Any natural person under
the Act includes both foreign and U.S. nationals. Id.
87. See Alexander, supra note 84, at 1602 (postulating that Congress may have exceeded its jurisdiction by
proposing to impose sanctions on other nations).
88. See Anwar Faruqi, Allies Ignoring U.S. Sanctions Against Iran: Saudis To Attend Tehran Conference,
THE SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 7,1997, at A1O; see also E.U. Mending Diplomatic Fences With Tehran, HINDU, July
23, 1998 (declaring that foreign critics of I.L.S.A. condemned the U.S. position of asserting dominance over other
sovereign countries); see also Cook Warning on Iran Rift, FIN. T., Jan. 16, 1998, at 3 (London) (declaring that U.K.
foreign secretary, Robin Cook, suggested that the United Kingdom and the EU could not cooperate with U.S. policy
on Iran under the threat of a sanctions gun).
89. F.U., U.S. Disagree on Iranian Sanctions, DEtMrSCHEPRESEE-AGEnr, Jan. 15,1998 (declaring that
EU could not support U.S. policies on Iran while being compelled by sanctions); see also E.U. Mending Diplomatic
Fences With Tehran, supra note 88 (claiming that EU was critical of U.S. efforts to isolate Iran and exercise
dominion over 15 EU countries and Russia); see also Asaro, supra note 81 at 507, n.22 (distinguishing between
primary and secondary boycott).
90. See Faruqi, supra note 88 (meeting on December 9,1997 of leaders from Muslim nations in Tehran was
the largest gathering of heads of state in Iran's history, both before and after the revolution); see also U.S. Isolated
in Policy of Trying to Isolate Iran, PEORIA JOURNAL STAR, Dec. 7,1997, at A4 (declaring that as the second largest
holder of world oil reserves, Iran's oil wealth could not be ignored); see also Thai FM Visits Iranfor Trade Talks,
AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE, Nov. 20, 1998 (indicating Thai government considered improving trade relations with
Iran by engaging in the trade of oil, gas, food ind industry goods).
91. See McQuaile & Lorenzetti, supra note 9 (stating several oil companies, including Shell, BP, and
Conoco entered talks with Iran concerning oil deals); see also U.S. Isolated in Policy of Trying to Isolate Iran,
supra note 90 (proclaiming that investments include a US$20 billion natural gas deal signed by Turkey and a US$2
billion dollar Russian & Malaysian partnership with Iran).
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finding that the transactions in question did not violate the letter of the I.L.S.A.
statute.92
Other countries, such as Canada and China, followed in disregard for the threat
of sanctions made pursuant to I.L.S.A. and invested well over the-US$40 million
limit in Iran.93 The U.S. eventually reacted to this outright defiance of I.L.S.A. by
imposing sanctions against those foreign businesses investing in lran. 4 Realizing
that the general consensus of I.L.S.A. was unpopular with the international
community, the U.S. carefully reconsidered its position." The U.S. took into
account the perspectives of EU and Asian companies which were not indifferent to
the U.S. objectives of assuaging international terrorism, but were rather predicated
upon their dependence on Iranian petroleum products.
96
Competition between world markets, caused by the dwindling levels of natural
resources, left the United States out in the cold of foreign trade with Iran.97 With
Europe and Asia dominating the Iranian market, combined with the fear of
increased competition with these regions, the United States abated its policy to
enforce I.L.S.A.98 Inevitably, the United States yielded to diplomatic pressure from
92. See Albright Stays Finn on Iran, FIN. T. Jan. 16,1998, at 4 (London) (stating U.S. Secretary of State,
Madeline Albright warned that I.L.S.A. is American law that the U.S. was prepared to enforce); see also U.S.
Isolated in Policy of Trying to Isolate Iran, supra note 90 (explaining how U.S. determined that the agreement
designed to transport natural gas to Western markets was technically not violative of I.L.S.A.).
93. See Middle East Economic Briefs, XINHA EN. N., Nov. 21, 1998 (finding that China and Iran traded
US$1.38 billion in 1997, including Iranian exports to China of oil and minerals, and exports from China to Iran of
electronic equipment, fabrics, and metals); see also Asaro, supra note 81, at 509 (stating that Canada invested
US$212 million to develop oil fields in Iran in clear defiance of LLS.A.).
94. See Angus Mackinnon, E!.U Resumes Ministerial Contacts With Iran, AoEG -FR.-PRESSE, Feb. 23,
1998 (indicating that the U.S. had expectations of imposing sanctions on oil companies Total, Russia's Gazprom
and Malaysia's Petronas for participating in developing off shore Iranian oil field). But see McQuaile & Lorenzetti,
supra note 9 (stating sanctions were later lifted).
95. See Iran: US. Eases Rules on Petrochem Deals, MID. E. ECON. DIG. Nov. 20,1998, at 12 (establishing
that the Clinton administration would relax some of its sanction rules imposed on Iran as a goodwill gesture toward
Iranian President Khatami because the U.S. desired to improve bilateral relations with Iran). The U.S. removed the
requirement that the sale of certain petrochemical goods and transactions were to be reported to the easury
Department. Il
96. See EU., U.S. Disagree on Iranian Sanctions, supra note 89 (stating that EU isolating Iran economially
would not restrict Iran's ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction); see also Airight Stays Finn on Iran, supra
note 92 (specifying that EU proposals for a tougher stance on Iran were promising).
97. See Lee Hamilton, U.S. Goals in the Gulf Current Policy Isn't Sustainable and Should be Changet
CRI ScMNCEaMoNoR, Dec. 24,1997, at 18 (declaring that the U.S. has vital interests in the Persian gulf
including access to energy resources at competitive prices); see also US. Isolated in Policy of Trying to Isolate
Iran, supra note 90 (indicating that there was internal pressure on the U.S. government from 440 American
companies lobbyingfor a lifting of economic sanctions against Iran).
98. See Hamilton, supra note 97 (postulating that U.S. inability to acquire oil at competitive prices may
result in an economic advantage to regional allies). But see Albright Stays Firm on Iran, supra note 92 (threatening
that U.S. imposition of sanctions on France/Russia for an Iranian gas contract was a very real possibility).
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the EU and waived sanctions against French, Russian, and Malaysian companies
involved in a US$2 billion energy agreement with Iran. 9
Despite these limited investment transactions in Iran, I.L.S.A. restrictions
greatly diminished economic growth and development within the country.10°
Although opposed to I.L.S.A.'s sanction policy, European investment in Iran has
been inhibited due to the Europeans' desire to maintain amicable U.S. relations
while still fulfilling its petroleum requirements.01 When foreign investments-in Iran
declined, Iran's primary export of petroleum products decreased, ultimately
contributing to an inhibition of Iran's economy.'02 Furthermore, the stringent
prohibitions on investment led to a decline in not only the production of petroleum,
but that of other goods and services as well.1°3 The end result has been the crippling
of Iran's economy, leaving only scant resources for the basic human needs of
Iranian nationals, with none remaining for terrorist suppor
t. °4
Despite this economic depression' °5 the Iranians are optimistic that their
economy will begin to recover as foreign investments in Iran steadily increase."°
Even though the apparent erosion of I.L.S.A., in regards to European and Asian
transactions with Iran, has created a new atmosphere between Iran and Europe, U.S.
relations with Iran remained strained. 7 Iran ultimately realized that due to U.S.
influence on other nations, and the fact that the United States had been the primary
investor in Iran prior to the revolution, U.S. support was needed to revitalize Iranian
99. Douglas Jehl, Iran Smiles After U.S. Waives Sanctions Against 3 Companes, N. Y. TIMEs, May 20,
1998, at A13; see also McQuaile & Lorenzetti, supra note 9, at 1 (announcing that the United States would not
impose sanctions against oil companies Total, Petronas, and Gazprom for their US$2 billion investment in Iran).
100. See Alexander, supra note 84, at 1612 n. 67 (citing H.R. REP. NO.104-523) (stating that without foreign
investment, production of Iran's oil and gas revenue will fall, thereby diminishing Iran's national economic
resources).
101. See McQuaile & Lorenzetti, supra note 9, at I (propounding the idea that businesses were now less
restrained by .L.S.A. to invest in Iran after the U.S. waived sanctions against three oil manufacturers).
102. See Middle East Economic Briefs, supra note 93 (stating that despite foreign investment in Iran, foreign
debt has only been reduced from US$23 billion to US$19.5 billion from 1995 to 1997, respectively).
103. See Stephen J. Glain, supra note 2 (depicting Iran's current need for goods and services despite some
investment in Iran).
104. See Alexander, supra note 84, at 1612 n.67 (hypothesizing that U.S. policy in enacting LL.S.A., which
was to reduce petroleum resources and limit Iran's ability to repay foreign debt has been successful); see also
Asaro, supra note 77 (emphasizing that petroleum is Iran's primary source ofrevenue which when reduced affects
Iran's ability to sustain other forms of national business operations).
105. See Pearl, supra note I (indicating that growth in early 1998 was expected to be 3% while inflation was
20%). Over 500,000 more Iranian citizens will be employed than in the previous year. Id; see also Iran: Relief on
Debts Sought, Despite Fall in Value, Mm. E. ECON. D., Nov. 20, 1998, at 11 (proclaiming that Iran's financial
problems were due in part to Iran's partial payment of foreign creditors and missed installment payments).
106. See Daniszeweski, supra note 1 (reiterating that the Iranian people are hopeful that their President will
improve the economy while bringing more freedom to its citizens).
107. See Albright Stays Finn on Iran, supra note 92 (emphasizing that the United States is still unwilling to
fully support Iran because of its firm belief that Iran is a major contributor of weapons of mass destruction and
international terrorism)
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economy."0 8 To remedy this problem, Iran decided it was time to restore relations
with the United States and resume prior political and economic ties between Iran
and the United States."°
III. A NEW ERA OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS
As a demonstration of Iran's change in policy toward the United States, Iranian
President Muhammad Khatami made a revelationary statement on Cable News
Network (CNN) asking for cultural exchanges between the United States and
Iran.n ° President Khatami stated that an exchange of scholars, artists, writers, and
tourists between Iran and the United States could begin to break the cultural and
economic barriers between the two countries."' Mr. Khatami's pronouncement to
the West was met with mixed reaction from both Iranian and foreign sources.,
2
Although still optimistic, President Khatami was critical of U.S. policy on Iran in
the past and warned that both sides would be wary and distrustful in establishing
new ties in the future.'13 He suggested that Iran desired a relationship with the
United States based on justice and mutual respect, rather than upon their past
misgivings.1 4
108. See Iran's President Khatami Callsfor Investment by the US., WAL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1998, at A19
(appealing to the U.S. government, President Khatami asked the United States to resume investments with Iran).
However, during the same sitting Khatami emphasized that Iran could get by without the United States, if the
United States would not reciprocate in exchanges with Iran. Id.
109. See id. (referring to Khatami is announcement to United Nations General Assembly asking for better
Western relations with Iran).
110. See also Iranian MP Sets Conditions on Normalization of Relations, XINHUA EN. N., Jan. 3, 1998
(stating that prior to Mr. Khatami's Jan. 7, 1998 announcement was a general proclamation on Dec. 7, 1997 voicing
Iran's willingness to begin a dialogue with America). But see George Gedda, U.S. to Consider Offer of Cultural
Exchdnges, ASs'D PRESS, Jan. 8, 1998, (indicating that President Clinton's stated that cultural exchanges are not
a substitute for inter-governmental dialogue between the United States and Iran).
111. See A Softer Iran Gets Attention: U.S. to Take Serious Look at Proposals, TULsA WORLD, Jan. 9,1998,
at 9 [hereinafterA Softer Iran Gets Attention] (detailing how President Khatami told CNN that exchanges would
create a "crack in the wall of mistrust" between the United States and Iran). Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khatami's
predecessor, stated that Iran is more interested in resuming economic rather then political ties with America. Id.;
see also Eric Margolis, Iran's Overtures Should Be Answered Likewise, ARAB. AM. N., Jan. 23, 1998, at 7
(discussing Khatami's rendition of the bitter history between the United States and Iran, after which he cautiously
extended an offer of peace to the West).
112. See A Softer Iran Gets Attention, supra note 111 (referring to U.S. State Department spokesman, James
Rubin, who stated that the United States was open to Khatami's offer but still required Iran to alter its policy toward
terrorism); see also Daniszeweski, supra note 1 (stating that many Iranian youth wanted cultural exchanges with
the United States so that they could have more personal autonomy and less government restrictions). Iranian
conservatives were critical of Khatami's offer to the West and emphasized that Iran should have focused on its
internal economic problems instead. Id.; see also Pearl, supra note I (discussing that left wing parties wanted to
disburse funds to the poor and re-vamp state industries before reaching out to the West).
113. See A Softer Iran Gets Attention, supra note Ill (noting the "Wall of Mistrust").
114. See Daniszeweski, supra note 1 (relaying the general consensus of Iranian youth which was the
establishment of a fair relationship between the United States and Iran); see also Iran: US. Overtures NeedActlon,
NEWSDAY, June 19, 1998, at A23 (stating that Iran wanted President Clinton to know that Iran desired a
reconciliation based on mutuality and reciprocity).
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Approximately six months after President Khatami appeared on CNN, President
Clinton reciprocated Iran's offer by stating that the United States would seek a
genuine reconciliation with Iran." 5 The U.S. President suggested that the United
States and Iran could once again become allies as they had been prior to the 1979
hostage crises.11 6 However, this offer to Iran was premised on Iran first changing its
position in support of international terrorism."' The U.S. believed that Iran
attempted to acquire nuclear technology and other weaponry which could
potentially threaten its neighbors. 8 Despite these impediments, Iran and the United
States understand that their cultural differences and turbulent history would not
make reconciliation impossible.Y9 Ultimately, both countries have expressed their
willingness in working toward this goal." °
The reconciliation between Iran and the United States comes at a time after
Iran's economy felt the strain of the Iran-Iraq war, twenty years of Iran-U.S.
Tribunal decisions, and now most recently I.L.S.A.12 1 The impact of these events
has resulted in low tourism, exorbitant inflation, and a high unemployment rate,
making many Iranians desperate for a new policy toward the West. ' To counteract
Iran's economic stagnation during the last twenty years, President Khatami has
altered Iran's foreigi policy to include improved relations with U.S. businesses.2 3
115. See Clinton Optimistic About Changes in Iran, FLA. TIMES-UNION, June 19, 1998, at A12 (explaining
that President Clinton was exploring what future with Iran might hold); see also Iran Changes Positive, A Hopeful
ClintonSays, PAINDEALER4, June 19,1998, at 6A (declaring that the United States wants a genuine reconciliation
with Iran); see also Robin Wright, Iran Says U.S. Is Imperiling Move Toward Reconciliation, L.A. TIMES, May 5,
1998, at Al (indicating U.S. government was committed to pursuing improved relations with Iran); see also Robert
Burns, Clinton Open to Iran Reconciliation, AR. REP., June 19, 1998, at A4 (emphasizing that President Clinton
wished to support the positive changes exhibited by Iran).
116. See Clinton: Let's Renew Friendship With Iran, supra note 5 (stating that U.S. relations can be restored
after years of isolating the Persian Gulf). But see Iran Changes Positive, A Hopeful Clinton Says, supra note 115
(establishing that good relations with the United States cannot be restored until the United States renounces the past
50 years of wrong policies against Iran).
117. See Clinton Optimistic About Changes in Iran, supra note 115 (prefacing new relations with Iran on its
change in policy regarding international terrorism and nuclear weapons); see also Wright supra note 115 (relaying
that Iran is frustrated because the United States continues to interfere with Iranian internal affairs and to offer poor
treatment toward Iranian athletes and visitors coming to the United States.)
118. See Burns, supra note 115.
119. See A Softer Iran Gets Attention, supra note 11I.
120. See id. (acknowledging Iranian differences but still hopeful for cultural exchanges); see also It= U.S.
Overtures Need Action, supra note 114 (claiming that the United States is still optimistic about resuming good
relations with Iran); see also U.S. Seeks Genuine Reconciliation With Iran, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENUIR, June 18,
1998 (stating that, according to U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, prospects for butter relations with Iran
must be balanced against Iran's continued support of terrorism).
121. See Pearl, supra note I (discussing Iran's economic crises including inflation, low exchange rates and
budget deficits leading many in Iran desperate for change).
122. See iL
123. See Glain, supra note 2 (indicating Iran's promotion of a change in policy toward foreign investors
within the region).
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To accommodate these businesses, Iran has made recent attempts to resume World
Bank funding, as well as join the World Trade Organization."
The Iranian President appealed to the United States to encourage business
investments in Iran despite the current prohibitions by I.L.S.A.12 Mr. Khatami
reasoned that U.S. sanctions on investments in Iran are harmful to U.S. companies,
as well as to Iran.'2 To further gage the U.S. commitment toward new relations
with Iran, Mr. Ihatami asked that American exporters be allowed to sell US$500
million in grains and sugar to Iran." During this same period, Atlantic Richfield
Oil Company (ARCO) was'the first U.S. company to bid on an Iranian oil contract
since I.L.S.A. was established in 1996.l2 Although the U.S. government still has
Congressional authority to impose sanctions on ARCO, the likelihood of that
occurring is quite low considering U.S. overtures to improve relations with Iran.'2
Eventually, other businesses and exporters will come to Iran to meet its demand
for goods and services. 130 Many investors have come to realize that as one of the last
frontiers for investment and growth, Iran is an ideal marketplace for transnational
investments. 3 ' This trend to investment in Iran will ultimately lead to an abundance
of investors bringing more opportunities to Iran. 1 32 As investments increase in Iran,
the question that must be asked is what law will govern disputes arising between
124. See Pearl, supra note 1 (setting forth that Iran sent a team to Washington to establish World Bank
funding which was cut off in 1995 as a result of pressure from the United States). At the same time, Iran took the
appropriate first steps for joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). let
125. See Iran's President Khatami Calls for Investment, supra note 108 (calling for U.S. investment in Iran
despite the current I.L.S.A. prohibitions).
126. See id. (indicating that President Khatami believed that U.S. investors and industrialists are most harmed
by sanctioning U.S. businesses that wish to invest in Iran); see also Oil & Gas In Iran, Bus. MID. E., Feb. 6, 1999
(describing how ARCO's CEO criticized I.LS.A. sanction provisions as a competitive disadvantage to U.S.
businesses).
127. See Grain As Litmus Test, CH imrw ScIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 5, 1999, at 10 (stating that Iran is
attempting to see if the United States has in fact weakened its policy toward LLS.A. sanctions). The authors
suggested that the request for grain and sugar was a one-time exception to I.L.S.A. Id
128. See Oil & Gas In Iran, supra note 126 (reporting by Islamic News Agency (IRNA) that Arco is taking
advantage of U.S. change in policy of imposing sanctions by making the first bid on an Iranian oil contract since
IL.S.A. was enacted).
129. See id (affirming U.S. ability to impose sanctions on businesses and cautioning that investors must tread
carefully when deciding whether to invest in Iran).
130. See Iran: South Korean and Japanese Firms Submit Refinery Bids, MID. E. ECON. DIG., Nov. 20,1998,
at 12 (explaining how Iranian Oil Ministry is evaluating five construction bids from Asian and local companies);
see also Petrochemicals in Iran: Catalyst Needed, MID. E. ECON. DIG., Feb. 6, 1999 (stating that Iran is seeking
European and U.S. investors to support its several oil development projects that it has planned for the next few
years).
131. See Hamilton, supra note 97, at 18 (enumerating the vitally important interests that the U.S. has in the
Persian Gulf including access to energy resources at reasonable prices, the security of regional allies, and the
prevention of foreign powers gaining control over the region).
132. See Iran: South Korean and Japanese Firms Submit Refinery Bids, supra note 130 (postulating that as
foreign investments increase, Iran will be better able to finance more of its local projects leading to heightened
national and foreign business opportunities in Iran).
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theses two countries: Iranian or United States?133 This Comment postulates that the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal decisions, which are the largest body of international law
between the United States and Iran, 34 will likely weigh heavily in future dispute
resolutions and business planning between the two investing entities.' 35 Although
not conclusive, a legal practitioner planning a transnational investment with Iran
should be familiar with some of the findings and nuances of the Tribunal
decisions.' 36
IV. IMPACT OF IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL DECISIONS ON IRAN
Since the Tribunal's first meeting on July 1, 1981, the Tribunal has reviewed
the thousands of claims presented before it.13 Because of its uniqueness and
volume, the Tribunal's findings, although not precedential, 33 give an accurate
assessment of the outcome of similarly situated disputes arising in other settings
involving international claims adjudication. 39 A practitioner of international law,
who is counseling business entities intending to invest in Iran, must be aware of the
far reaching results of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.'4 Therefore, it is crucial that
a practitioner be well informed on what products are needed in Iran,' 41 the law
133. See generaUy MAPPsupra note 18, preface (referencing the importance of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
and its significance to the United States and Iran).
134. See BROWER & BRUESCHMK, supra note 4, at 658 (detailing the magnitude of the Tribunal and its
uniqueness regarding U.S. and Iranian dispute resolution). The authors declared the vastness of the Tribunal
decisions. Id
135. See Richard B. Liich and David . Bederman, Jurisprudence of the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission: Iran Claims. 91 AM. J. INT'LL 436,463 (1997) (espousing that interpretations of settlement claims
of the Tribunal may be a valuable source of opinions on the law of international claims). But see Caron, supra note
4, at 104 (suggesting that the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal will not be persuasive because of the unique type of
arbitration it involves).
136. See BROWER & BRUESCHKF, supra note 4. preface (stating that the impressive work of the Tribunal
should be available to the resolution of both present disputes and future tribunals).
137. See &L at 658 (establishing that as of 1998, the Tribunal has disposed of over 95% of its claims equaling
total settlements in the amount US$2,000,000,000 between Iranian and U.S. nationals); see also Lillich and
Bederman, supra note 135, at 437 (indicating that the Tribunal had approximately 3.100 small claims presented
to it and of those, 578 claims were dismissed, 1,422 were denied, and approximately 1,066 were adjudicated).
138. See BROWER & BREScHKE, supra note 4, at 669 (claiming that in certain areas involving international
law the decisions of the Tribunal are, arguably, persuasive).
139. SeeLillichandBederman, supra note 135, at463 (concluding that interpreting the lump sum settlement
claims between the United States and Iran would be a useful source of legal opinion to the international
community).
140. Id. (proclaiming that the outcome of the Tribunal impacts several areas of international law narrowly).
141. See infra notes 145-59 and accompanying text (describing Iran's need for new parts, especially those
used in the agriculture and the oil industry).
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applying to those products, 4 ' and the possible interpretation or outcome an
international tribunal or arbitrator 43 may reach based on the applicable law.
144
A. Iran's Need For Spare Parts
The role of the legal practitioner may not stop at the confines of the
transnational agreement. 4 In addition to drafting a contract that fulfills the legal
needs of an investor, a practitioner may be called upon to give advise on the areas
or types of investment most lucrative in Iran.'1 Even though there is a need for all
types of trade in Iran, the most immediate one is Iran's requirement for spare
parts.' 47 In recent years, fran has demonstrated a shortage of replacement parts of
all types,1 "8 a fact that may be crucial to advising a potential investor in Iran.49
Since being virtually cut off from Western trade during the last twenty years,' Iran
has had great difficulty in obtaining spare parts and maintaining its machinery,
especially that used in agriculture.' 5' As Iran's machinery, including tractors, oil
equipment, auto parts, and factory tools have aged, the lack of replacement parts has
crippled Iran's ability to maintain its foreign and domestic economic interests.152 To
compensate, Iran has had to accept lines of credit from foreign nations in order to
142. See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
COMMENTARY & MATERIALS (Klumer Law and Taxation Publishers) (1994).
143. See Caron, supra note 4, at 123 (identifying that international legal disputes may be resolved at the
International Court of Justice, by private arbitrations, or in municipal courts).
144. See infra 186-237 and accompanying text (presenting several aspects of the Tribunal's decisions which
may aid a practitioner in designing a transnational agreement).
145. See MODELRULESOFPROFESSIONALCONDUcr Rule 2.1 (1983) (stating that when acting as an advisor
to a client, a lawyer must render independent judgement and render candid advice). If the lawyer knows that the
client is planning a course of action that will adversely effect that client, the attorney may offer advice without being
asked. Id
146. See id (asserting the notion that a lawyer may give a client not only legal advice, but also moral,
economic, social or political advice where that is relevant to the client's situation).
147. See Iran Set To Raise Production, AuSm. NEws ABSiRACrs, Jan. 18, 1999 (maintaining that Iran
wishes to increase revenues by expanding its oil products rates if it can obtain the necessary spare parts to refurbish
its oil industry).
148. See Glain, supra note 2 (indicating that Iran is in desperate need of all types of spare parts in order to
continue operating its aging machinery).
149. See MODEL RULES OF PROFssIONAL CONDucr, supra note 145 (permitting attorneys the authority to
offer unsolicited economic advice to their clients).
150. See BROWER & BRUEsCHKE, supra note 4, at 19 (explaining that relationg between Iran and the United
States remained severed ever since the 1979 American Hostage crises); see also James A. Nathan, Is It 7ne To
Bury The Hatchet With Iran?, USA TODAY, Jan. 11999, at 22 (proclaiming that as a result of I.L.S.A., the United
States has been successful in denying Iran spare parts for oil and engineering equipment); see also Pearl, supra note
1, at 3 (indicating that Iranian export director is making tour buses using spare parts that were acquired from
Mercedes engines).
151. See Glain, supra note 2 (indicating that since the 1979 Iranian revolution, farmers have had to
compensate for their increasingly aged fleet of 650,000 tractors used for agricultural purposes).
152. See id (examining the harsh reality that Iran's low per capita income of $US800 has disabled the ability
of Iranian nationals to maintain their aging equipment). European and Asian distributors of luxury cars, tractors and
tools where disappointed that Iran lacked the ability to purchase new goods. Id
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purchase the necessary spare parts required for its oil industry.153 Despite these
shortcoming, Iran has still been able to attract foreign investors to the region."'
Astute investors from all over the world are flocking to Iran to meet the new
market of millions of potential Iranian customers. 55 Many believe that Iran is one
of the largest markets in the world for spare parts because they lack the resources
to purchase large volumes of new products.1  Since funds are limited and the fact
that Iran's industrial and farming equipment is aging and deteriorating, some
believe that the market for spare parts in Iran has never been greater.1 57 As the sale
of spare parts in Iran increase, practitioners of international law must be prepared
to plan accordingly.158 These plans should include both the specific provisions for
the goods involved in the trade and also other essential aspects of the investment,
including provisions for the choice of law or applicable law in the event that a
dispute arises between the contracting parties. 59
B. What Law May Govern the New Marketplace
A practitioner must plan carefully when considering the importance and
complexity of choice of law provisions which govern a transnational agreement.' 60
Generally, four different choice of law issues can arise in international commercial
arbitration.1 61 These include: first, the substantive law that will apply to the merits
of the contract; 62 second, the substantive law applying to the arbitration agreement
153. See Iran Reaches Deal to Reschedule Two Billion Dollars in Foreign Debt, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR. Feb. 9. 1999 (declaring that French and Italian insurance firms have extended a two and five year line
of credit to Iran so that Iran may purchase machinery, spare parts and raw materials).
154. See Iran: South Korean and Japanese Firms Submit Refinery Bids, supra note 130 (stating that several
Asian investors are negotiating Iranian contracts).
155. See Push For Isolating Iran Lacks Arab, European Support Greensboro, NEWS & RECORD, Dec. 7,
1997, at A12 (stating that European and Arab investors have gathered in Iran to determine what the future may hold
regarding transnational investments with Iran).
156. See Glain, supra note 2 (quoting an agent for the Gasket Manufacturing & Trading Co. who claims that
Iran is an enormous market for spare parts despite a shortage of foreign currency).
157. See Michael Weiss, Illegal Trade Charges Against Norcross Company End 3-Year Federal
Investigation, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 4, 1998, at D1 (stating that there is a dire need for spare parts to replace
American-made products, including cars, trucks, and airplanes which are already in Iran).
158. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 145 (claiming that an attorney's
responsibility to the client does not merely end with her legal duties).
159. See infia notes 186-237 and accompanying text (analyzing the outcome ofthe Tribunal regarding spare
part and contracts generally).
160. See BORN, supra note 142, at 24 (explaining that although choice of law provisions are often useful in
avoiding litigation, their complexity gives rise to a myriad of other issues).
161. See infra notes 162-166 and accompanying text (delineating the four types of conflict of law issues
arising in an commercial international agreement).
162. See BORN, supra note 142, at 100 (identifying that there are varied rules applied during commercial
arbitration based on whether the parties have expressly agreed to the law governing the merits or whether the law
must be ascertained in the absence ofan express agreement by the contracting parties). Some states will not enforce
choice of law agreements if the chosen law is contrary to the public policy of the forum. Id at 121.
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itself;' 63 third, the law applying to the arbitration proceedings;1" and, fourth, the
conflict of law rules applied to the selection of foregoing three issues.6' Planning
the appropriate conflict of law provisions could be critical to gaining an advantage
in the event of an international claims dispute.166
Alternatively, the Tribunal took a more simplistic approach when analyzing the
law controlling the contract. 67 Upon establishing the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
Iran and the United States agreed that the Tribunal would decide all cases on the
basis of "respect for law."' This means that both Iran and the United States
recognized the limitations of their sovereign authority to adjudicate claims, while
acknowledging that their sovereignty is subject to the confines of international
law."6 Thus, although their decisions must be "based on respect for law," the
Tribunal is granted broad discretion in choosing the applicable law that they deem
appropriate.!7" Initially, this broad discretion of the Tribunal created confusion after
some advocated applying the law of the contract while others endorsed the law of
the place where the contract was to be performed."7'
163. See id. at 154 (emphasizing that because an arbitration agreement is so complex, it is often believed to
be separable from the underlying contract). This law relating to the arbitration agreement is applicable to the
document's validity, effect and interpretation. Mi
164. See idi at 26 (detailing that the law applying to the arbitration proceedings include procedural issues,
the enforceability of the agreement, judicial standards and ethics, to name a few). The law applying to the
arbitration proceedings may be the most important choice of law consideration because this law influences almost
every aspect of the arbitration, including the scope of discovery and the removal of arbitrators. L
165. See id. at 26 (indicating that the selection of conflict of laws may involve application of the arbitration
forum's conflict of law rules, international rules, or the rules of the interested states).
166. See id at 24 (identifying the usefulness ofa well-planned conflict of law issues in avoiding some forms
of litigation).
167. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 640 (stating that the Tribunal has used broad discretion
of an indeterminate source when determining choice of law).
168. See Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 71, art. V (explaining that the basis for the "respect for
law" provision is a mandate by art. V which states that the Tribunal shall apply "such choice of law rules and
principals of commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account
relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed circumstances").
169. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribuna, 92 AM. J. INT'LL. 149
(1998) (reviewing GEORGEH. ALDRICH'S book and postulating that the sovereign actions of states over other states
and individuals are subject to the restrictions of generally accepted principals of international law).
170., See BROWER&BRuEscHKE, supra note 4, at 632-33 (specifying that Article V of the Claims Settlement
Declaration does not require the Tribunal to apply any specific system of conflict of laws or any other substantive
law when determining the applicable law). The Tribunal has enormous freedom and discretion when resolving a
conflict of law issue. Id The broad discretion granted to the Tribunal is based on a case-by-case analysis in order
to give the Tribunal the ability to resolve the broad range of cases coming before it. Id
171. See Oil Fields of Texas v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 347 (1981-82) (indicating that the Tribunal
had to first decide whether to apply Iranian municipal law or that of Texas before they could get to the issue of
liability and damages under the contract); see also, Tipton F. McCubbins, Protecting the Rights oflnvestors In the
International Arena: A Case for Binding Arbitration, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 523, 534 (1998) (advocating that,
in cases of conflict of law, the law of the place where the contract is performed should be applied).
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The Tribunal resolved these disputes, overtime, by concluding that the Tribunal
would apply the law based on two general categories.' 72 The first category,
concerning the interpretation of the Algiers Accords itself, involved application of
principals of public international and treaty law.'" The second category, concerning
both private and inter-governmental claims, entails the application of four sources
of law.' 74 The Tribunal has further divided this latter category into public
international law claims and private commercial claims.'7 5 For public international
law claims, either treaty law 76 or customary international law applies. 7 In regards
to private conunercial claims, the Tribunal has applied the law of the contract as
agreed upon by the parties 178 or general principals of commercial law.179 However,
upon analyzing the overall application of general principals of conflict of laws
applied by the Tribunal, it becomes apparent that there is no established pattern or
rule used by the Tribunal which can be applied in any given case.t
Despite this uncertainly as to which law will ultimately be applied to an
agreement, a practitioner would be prudent to include provisions for conflict of law
172. See BROWER & BREscHKE, supra note 4, at 633 (stating that the Tribunal's choice of law discretion
was broadly designed to address two general categories of issues).
173. See ik at 263 (explaining that the Tribunal's approach to treaty law is based on the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties which are further based on customary international law applying to treaty interpretation).
174. Seeid. at 633-34 (claiming that all other questions arise under either treaty law, customary international
law, the law of the contract as agreed upon by the parties, or general principals of commercial law). But see MAPP,
supra note 18, at 121 (stating that, generally, there are two kinds of laws applied by the Tribunal: firstly, municipal
law has been applied to contract disputes between nationals of one country against the government of the other, and
secondly, international law has been applied by the United States or Iran, as official claims against the other nations'
government arising from a contractual breach).
175. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text (explaining that the Tribunal's choice of law
determinations in various categories have not been uniformly applied).
176. See BROWER & BRuEscHKE, supra note 4, at 633 n. 3005 (indicating that this treaty law was based on
the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, June 16, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 900).
177. See Oil Fields of Texas v. Iran, supra note 171 (holding in dicta that the Tribunal has authority to use
international law to supplement the applicable municipal law in order to ensure that foreign nationals are not denied
justice).
178. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 636 (determining that the terms of the contract, although
not determinative, have been a starting point for the Tribunal when resolving questions of contract interpretation).
But see MAPP, supra n6te 18, at 121 (citing Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 16
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 27, and stating that the Tribunal does not deem it appropriate that a transaction be
governed by the law of one party to the contract).
179. See DIC of Delaware, Inc. v. Tehran Development Corp., 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 144 (1985)
(explaining how the Tribunal held that U.S. municipal law must conform to general principals of commercial and
international law); see also Economy Forms Corp. v. Iran, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 42 (1983) (concluding that
general principals of law applied to a contract predominantly performed in Iowa, U.S.); see also Anaconda Iran Inc.
v. Iran, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 199 (1986) (suggesting that in contracts that do not include a choice of law
provision, the Tribunal will apply relevant principals of commercial law).
180. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 639 (concluding that the Tribunal's lack of attention to
detail when applying general principles of conflict of laws has made predicting the outcome of their findings
precarious). The uncertainty as to the analysis of conflict of laws by the Tribunal may have been the direct result
of an overriding application of general principals of commercial law and lex mercatoria by the Tribunal. Ie; see
also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (6th ed. 1990) (defining ex mercatoria as that system of commercial laws
which is adopted by all nations, and constitutes a part of the law of the land).
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issues in the contract.' Parties planning on entering business transactions in Iran
may wish to include these choice of law clauses in their contract despite the fact
that the Tribunal decisions are not binding authority on their transactions.18 2 In
addition to including the proper choice of law provisions, a practitioner must also
be versed on how those provisions may be decided by an arbitrator. 83 To alleviate
the uncertainty, several aspects of the Tribunal's decisions have been analyzed in
the following section.'" Accordingly, the focus in the following segment is on the
contract and the law ultimately applied to it by the Tribunal.'1
C. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Outcome on Spare Parts
Since the Tribunal began hearing cases in 1981, it has disposed of over 95% of
its caseload. t 6 Among the thousands of cases heard before the Tribunal, sixty-one
related in some way to claims arising from the sale of spare parts in Iran.' Some
of these cases were settled prior to coming before the Tribunal and others were
dismissed on jurisdictional issues.88 The remaining cases, which were adjudicated
on their merits, will be crucial to dispute avoidance or resolution arising from the
sale of spare parts or other goods in Iran.'89 Accordingly, the following three
sections will discuss the Tribunal's outcome based on frustration of the parties
contractual purpose or force majeure,' 90 contractual terms 9' and breach of
contract.192
181. SeeBORN, supra note 142, at24 (reflecting the opinion thatthe there arebenefits to a contract containing
well planned choice of law provisions).
182. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 4, at 655 (postulating that although not binding, the Tribunal
decisions may be persuasive nonetheless).
183. See Lillich and Bederman, supra note 135, at 463 (concluding that the Tribunal's analysis of the small
claims brought before the Tribunal may be relevant to the legal community).
184. See infra notes 186-237 and accompanying text (explaining various aspects of the decisions of the
Tribunal which may be relevant to an investor in the event a dispute arises).
185. See iUL
186. See BROWER & BRuascHKE, supra note 4, at 658 (stating that the Tribunal has disposed of 95% of
claims submitted to it with every award to an American claimant being paid in full).
187. See infra notes 193-234 and accompanying text (analyzing claims based on spare parts which dealt with
contractual issues generally present in most transactions).
188. See Lillich and Bederman, supra note 135, at 437 (calculating that of the approximately 3,100 presented
to the Tihbunal, 578 claims were dismissed, 1,422 claims were denied and 1,066 awards were issued to the persons
party to the arbitration).
189. See BRowER&BRUEscHKEsupra note 4, at 664 (finding that the several volumes ofreported decisions
have contributed to the largest single body of precedent in public and commercial law). Many Iranian, American
and tiird country arbitrators have come to realize the utility derived from the Tribunal decisions and the uniformity
found in the principals of contract formation and interpretation between their countries. Id.
190. See infa notes 193-204 and accompanying text (describing the Tribunal's analysis ofcontracts that were
interrupted during the height of the Iranian Revolution in late 1978 to early 1979).
191. See infra notes 205-16 and accompanying text (explaining that considerable deference was given to the
parties contractual terms by the Tribunal).
192. See infra notes 217-37 and accompanying text (referring to alternate means of resolving contractual
disputes when the cause of the breach was not found to be force majeure related).
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1. Force Majeure
It was frequently the contention of a contracting party that the contract between
a U.S. party and an Iranian national was frustrated by the Iranian revolution of
1978-79.'93 This frustration of purpose under a contract was termed "force
majeure" or any cause of impossibility beyond the seller's reasonable control,
including lockouts, strikes, riots, or wars, that prevent one or both parties from
performing under the provisions of the contract."9 The Tribunal has repeatedly
asserted that if force majeure is found,196 a party is excused from further
performance under the contract. 97 However, parties may waive an excuse of
performance if their conduct, at the time of the precipitating events, suggested that
both parties considered the contract to still be in force.'9" As long as the parties'
expectations of continuing the contract were reasonable under the surrounding
circumstances, the Tribunal has upheld compensation under the contract. 99
193. See Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Iran-U.S.. 8 Iran Cl. Trib. Rep. 298 (1985) (invoking force
majeure in February 1979 to cancel the contract after several invoices went unpaid following the Revolution); see
also Queens Office Tower Associates v. Iran National Airlines Corp., 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 247 (1983)
(specifying that when force majeure is invoked the Tribunal has ultimate discretion to determine the equity of
allowing recovery); see also International School Services Inc. v. National Iranian Copper Industries Co., 9 Iran-
U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 187 (1985) (proclaiming that losses would often be retained after force majeure has been
declared by a contracting party).
194. See Gould Marketing Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense of Iran, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 147(1983)
(defining force majeure as social and economic forces beyond the power of the state to control through the exercise
of due diligence). "Injuries caused by the operation at such forces are therefore not attributable to the state for
purposes of its responding for damages." ILd. "As between private parties, one party cannot claim against the other
for injuries suffered as a result delays in or cessation of performance during the time force majeure conditions
prevail, unless the existence of these conditions is attributable to the fault of the respondent party." lId
195. See International Technical Products Corp. v. Islamic Rep. ofIran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 206 (1985)
(finding that by December 1978, civil strife had created classical force majeure conditions persisting as late as June
1979 in some cities); see also Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 23, at 125
(1983) (striking halting oil drilling was found to be caused by political unrest during September and November
1978).
196. See General Dynamics Telephone Systems Center v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
153 (1985) (giving weight to the fact that the contract was interrupted during late 1978 and early 1979); see also
Development and Resources Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20, at 63 (1990)
(finding force majeure conditions present); see also Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
135, at 39 (1987) (proclaiming force majeure was supported by the facts); see also Petrolane, Inc., v. Islamic
Republic ofIran, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 64, at [51 (1991) (indicating that interruption of the contract was force
majeure).
197. See International School Services Inc. v. National Iranian Copper Industries Co., supra note 193
(quoting that after force majeure is found the "loss must lie were is falls').
198. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 579-389-2, at 59 (1997)
(indicating that both parties considered the contracts to be still in force and were anxious to resume performance
as conditions in Iran improved). Both parties met after the contract was initially interrupted and discussed how they
would resolve all disputes that had arisen during the preceding days. Id. at 1 40. After coming to an agreement to
resume performance of the contract the United States Embassy was seized within three days. Id. at 43.
199. Id. at[ 61 (specifying that by the end of 1979, the parties must have realized that conditions in Iran were
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future so as to continue performance under the contract). The Tribunal
determined that suspension of the contract could notbe indefinite without affecting the viability of the contract I&a
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If force majeure is found, the Tribunal indicated that parties are entitled to
payment for partial performance up until the time of excuse of performance
occurred under the contract.m This type of equitable remedy includes only actual
costs of performance or advance payments made before the date of termination of
the contract, and not compensation for lost profits or fees incurred after the date the
contract ended."°  To establish the right to compensation under the contract once
force majeure is found, the Tribunal often looks to detailed letters, billing
statements, or other correspondence which detailed the dates of goods sent and
suggests which party may have been at fault in frustrating performance of the
contract. °  As a prudent advisor, a transnational practitioner would serve her
clients' interest well by indicating that once a contract is formed, a detailed paper
trail should be created so that a future tribunal may determine the value of
performance due if in fact the contract is found to be frustrated °3 Another
consideration to make in drafting a contract involves the Tribunal's emphasis on
terms of the contract established by the parties.2
4
2. The Weight Given to Terms of the Contract
In determining terms of the contract, the Tribunal often looked to the contract
itself and how the parties acted once the contract was formed.2°5 In one case, the
Tribunal found that based on the terms of the contract, a breaching party could
The Tribunal concluded that despite the parties expectations, the contract had been terminated due to prolonged
force majeure conditions through the end of 1979. Id. But see Mobil Oil Co. v. Iran, supra note 178, (refusing to
terminate a long term contract because conditions were beginning to normalize by March 1979). The Mobil court
based its decision on the fact that the contract was long term and had the Iranian government as a party to the
agreement. Id
200. See Levitt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 145, at 75 (1991) (explaining that
the consequences of frustration of contract is such that amounts due under the contract are to be proportioned to
the extent the contract was performed). If payment has been made, the party which received such payment is
entitled to retain that amount of money proportionate to their performance and must return any money in excess
of that amount. d.; see also International School Services Inc., at 193 (concluding if no payment has yet been made,
the party which has performed is entitled to receive payment to the extent of that performance).
201. See Levitt 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep., at 75 (disallowing costs incurred after the date the contract was
found to be terminated); see also International School Services Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. Trib. Rep., at 187 (reiterating that
it was the practice of the Tribunal to withhold compensation for gains not yet realized).
202. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award No. 579-389-2, at [ 94-97 (tracing conversations, letters and
correspondence between the contracting parties, the Tribunal declared the right to compensation and the date of
actual termination of the contract).
203. See MAPP, supra note 18, at 127 (citing Khuzestan Water v. Power Authority, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
156 (1983) (indicating that the Tribunal looked to letters, telexes and the conduct of the parties to determine
whether the parties believed that they were still performing under a contract or in the absence of one).
204. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award No. 579-389-2, at 131 (supporting the assertion that the
Tribunal gives deference to the terms of the contract).
205. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award No. 579-389-2, at 186 (deciding that a negotiation agreement
reached by the parties was binding as evidenced by the parties behavior both before and after the negotiations took
place). The negotiation agreement although not signed by either party, suggested that both parties believed the
accuracy of the value of the work performed thus far. Id.
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terminate the contact if the other party acquiesced in the termination, ultimately
resulting in a waiver of a contractual requirement for written notice of
termination.2°6 This Tribunal result suggests that breaching parties are not
necessarily penalized for terminating a provision under the contract, as long as they
comply with the remaining contractual terms and the other party assents.' Other
cases have clearly indicated that if one party does not reject nonconformance of
goods within the period specified within the contract, then that party is considered
to have accepted the goods and is responsible for their costs.m After a party is
found to have accepted the nonconforming goods, he has waived his right to assert
that the goods are nonconforming at a later time.m These cases clearly indicate that
the Tribunal closely looks to the terms of the contract when deciding what weight
to give any party's claim.
210
Despite finding that a contract has been terminated, the Tribunal will still award
a fair and reasonable value for the extent of performance made prior to the date of
termination if contractual provisions allow for such awards. It appears from these
findings that the Tribunal will strictly honor terms of the contract as long as the
party's actions, following the termination of the contract, are not to the contrary. 212
In assessing value for partial performance or payment due before a contract is
terminated, the Tribunal often uses the currency conversion value of the
206. See Collins Systems International Inc. v. Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Tib.
Rep. 195, at [ 137 (1992) (concluding that the absence of objections to contractual requirements are presumed to
be correct); see also Houston Contracting Co. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 20 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 24-25
(1988) (indicating that failure to object results in acquiescence); see also Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award No.
579-389-2, at 186 (proclaiming that because the parties did not comply with written notice under the contract the
Tribunal stated the requirement was waived).
207. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award No. 579-389-2, at 137 (finding that the Iranian Air Force
verbally terminated one of several contracts with Westinghouse and Westinghouse acquiesced in this termination).
The Tribunal gave weight to the fact that the writing requirement included within the contract was waived by both
parties. Ik
208. See Chas T. Main International, Inc. v. Khucestan Water & Power Authority, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Thib. Rep.
156, 163-64 (1983) (claiming that non-contractual goods and services already accepted will be considered in
determining the amount due for claims of breach).
209. See Austin Co. v. Machine Sazi Arak, 12 Iran-U.S. C. Tub. Rep. 288, at 129-32 (1986) (declaring
that failure to complain contemporaneously as the alleged problems arose or thereafter, undermines the credibility
of its complaints in the proceeding); see also generally Harza v. Islamic Republic of Iran, I1 Iran-U.S. C. Trib.
Rep. 76 (1986).
210. See Questech v. Ministry of National Defense, 9 Iran-U.S. Ca. Trib. Rep. 107 (1985) (claiming that at
least initially, the Tribunal should look to the provisions of the contract itself to determine the consequences of a
party's claim). But see United Painting Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 351, at 49
(1989) (declaring that the Tribunal may use alternate means to determine liability).
211. See Levitt, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep., at 1 118 (holding that no recovery was available under the
provisions of the contract, but was established on the basis of the parties performance); see also Starrett Housing
Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. C. Trib. Rep. 112, 221 (1987) (indicating that when the
circumstances prevent calculation of an exact figure, the Tribunal will use its discretion to ascertain the amounts
to be recovered). This includes hiring expert witnesses. Id.
212. See generally Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award No. 579-389-2 1194-97 (analyzing the parties
actions surrounding the events of the breach).
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performance or payment at the time the contract was negotiated, not at the time the
contract was terminated.2 3 However, if the contract did not stipulate conversion
rates, the Tribunal would select the date on which the obligation or debt became due
and apply the rate of exchange applicable on that date.214 These findings greatly
suggest that the Tribunal gives great deference to the contractual terms where no
substantial Tribunal discretion is required.215 In cases requiring the Tribunal to
establish contractual terms, the Tribunal often declares that there is no basis for the
decision, resulting in a dismissal of that particular claim.216
3. Breach of Contract
In cases involving an interruption of contractual performance, other than
through force majeure claims,217 the Tribunal often considers whether the parties
breached the contract.28 The issue of breach often focuses on whether one party's
duty to perform ever arose if a condition precedent had not yet occurred. 2 9 More
specifically, claimants often assert that a breach of contract did not occur because
the other party had not first met his contractual obligations, such as supplying
invoices, parts, or payments which were necessary for the other party to perform
213. See CBS Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 131, at 57 (1990).
214. See Aeronutronic Overseas Services, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 223,
at 126 (1986) (declaring that the test applied by the Tribunal, when determining the correct date for the conversion
into U.S. dollars of rial amounts found payable, is to select the date on which the obligation became due and to
apply the rate of exchange applicable on that date in making conversion). However, this court also states that to
qualify for conversion, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the claimant would, in the normal course of business,
have repatriated the funds if they had been received on the due date. Id.
215. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Bank of Markazi Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 334 (1983) (specifying
that the Tribunal has given deference to the facts and terms of the contract with little reference to legal principals
which relate to the claim); see also Pomeroy v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 372 (1983) (stating that the Tribunal
did no more than set out the terms and facts surrounding the contract).
216. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award No. 579-389-2, at 1141 (dismissing claims by both the Iranian
Air Force and Westinghouse where contractual terms and the practice of the parties did not suggest a valid basis
for the claim). But see CLAIMS SETLEMENTDECLARAI1ON, art. V, supra note 168 (giving broad discretion to the
Tribunal to decide the applicable law of each claim).
217. See Teichmann Inc. v. Hamadon Glass Co., 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 124, at 66 (1986)
(distinguishing between breach of contract and force majeure, the Tribunal noted that the respondents could not
be excused based on force majeure when they were in continuing breach with respect to payment obligations under
the contract); see also MAPP, supra note 18, at 130 (stipulating that a claimant does not have a cause of action
unless a breach is found). A breach can occur by complete non-performance of the contract or just of a particular
term. Id. Alternatively, force majeure meant that the entire contract was generally terminated making it impossible
for either party to perform. Id.
218. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 334 (using a breach of contract analysis to illustrate
that non-payment of royalties due amounted to a breach).
219. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award No. 579-389-2, at 143 (claiming that until the Iranian Air
Force delivered prime equipment parts, Westinghouse was forced to cease further contractual efforts). However,
the case also indicates that it was the responsibility of Westinghouse and not the Iranian Air Force to supply the
required lists. Id.
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under the contract.m In responding to a potential breach of contract, the Tribunal
often considers the actions of the parties after the alleged breach occurred.2' If one
or both parties cease performance under the contract because of the breach, the
Tribunal will most likely conclude that a breach has occurred.222 However, if the
parties resume performance despite the alleged breaching event, then the Tribunal
construes such action as a waiver of the contractual provision which defines when
a breach could be declared2 23
After establishing breach of contract, the Tribunal takes a unique approach in
assessing whether damages should be allowed for the breach 2 In determining
damages for breach of contract, the Tribunal requires the party alleging the breach
to establish causation between the breaching act and the value of the damages
claimed.2 If no value for damages can be ascertained from the breaching events,
then no award will be made despite the breach of contract. 6 This position taken by
the Tribunal only applies in cases where the contracting parties did not clearly
indicate the value of goods or services in the contract. ' In the event that the parties
do include damage provisions for breach of contract, the Tribunal will generally
enforce those provisions.
220. See id at 126 (outlining aclaimby the Iranian AirForceindicatingthat Westinghouse failedtoprovide
the necessary contractually required computer specialist). The basis for this claim is that the work of the radar
specialist could not be provided until the computer specialist first performed their functions under the contractual
agreement. Id
221. See id. at 150 (tracing the letters, memorandum and correspondence between the parties to determine
if a breach occurred and who was in fact at fault).
222. See General Electric Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 148, at 30 (1991)
(stating that a breach of contract is likely to be found in cases where the parties have violated a term of the contract
unless their behavior after the alleged breach indicates the contrary).
223. See id. (holding that the substitution of work effort, once accepted, is deemed to be a waiver of
performance under the contract). The Tribunal declared that the acceptance of alternate services is considered
constructive substitution. Id. While the failure to perform as a condition precedents is considered a constructive
partial termination of the remaining contractual terms. Id.
224. See Agrostruct International v. Iran State Cereals Org, infra note 225 (stating that causation is required
before a breach can be established).
225. See Agrostruct International Inc. v. Iran State Cereals Org., Award 358-195-1, at 146 (1988) (holding
that the claim was dismissed because Agrostruct had not established a sufficient causal link between Cereal's delays
in opening the letter of credit and any loss to the business which may have occurred).
226. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award No. 579-389-2, at 1 190 (indicating that the Tribunal looked
to the terms of the contract when assessing valuation of goods or services). But see Gould Marketing Inc., 3 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 147 (stating that damages would be assessed based on the extent of performance up until the
date of breach).
227. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award No.579-389-2, atj 234-35 (specifying that the Tribunal gives
considerable deference to the terms of the contract that both parties had previously bargained for).
228. See General Electric Co., 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 148; See also Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award
No. 579-389-2, at 145 (listing damages claimed by General Electric including those arising from; (a) items
delivered but not paid for (b) products resold at a discount rate; (c) products resold to other customers in the
ordinary course of business; (d) unsold items; and (e) incidental damage). The Tribunal was reluctant to allow
damages unless the parties included such provisions in their contract. Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 391
(6th ed. 1990) (defining incidental damages as those resulting from a seller's breach of contract including any
commercially reasonable charges).
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The Tribunal ordinarily enforces contractual clauses limiting or excluding a
party's liability or limiting a party's contractual remedies for breach.2 In cases
where a contractual provision excludes consequential damages, ° the Tribunal has
indicated that there is no obstacle in enforcing such a clause, absent unreasonable
or unconscionable behavior.? 1 In deciding the appropriateness of limiting damages,
the Tribunal recognizes the principals of other legal systems.' 2 Generally, the
Tribunal has adopted the view of other legal systems that limitation of liability
clauses will not be given effect for a specific default when the default arose through
intentional wrong or gross negligence on the part of the party invoking the
limitation.
233
When drafting a contract, a legal practitioner must consider several factors
effecting the overall success of the investment. This includes the applicable law,
appropriateness of terms to include in the contract, as well as, possible provisions
for protecting one from breach of contact. In addition to legal aspects of the
contract, the practitioner must make other recommendations which may ultimately
effect the success of the investment.?35 In considering all factors, the practitioner
should be prepared to advise her client about how to protect an investment and to
offer alternative options available to the client.' This may include an awareness
of where to find financing and who will provide insurance coverage for the
investmenL
237
V. CREATING A SurrABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT
Since planning an investment would not be complete without first obtaining
financing or insurance coverage for the investment, the following segments are
229. See Itel International Corp. v. Social Security Organization of Iran, 24 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 272, at
53 (1990); see also American Bell International Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 74,
90(1984).
230. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990) (explaining consequential damages as such loss or
injury which does not flow directly from the breaching act of the party but only from some of the results of that act).
231. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., Award No. 579-389-2, at 265-66 (rejecting the claim of the Iranian
Air Force to exclude Westinghouses' limitation of liability clause due to a lack of facts supporting the conclusion
that the limitation of liability is unconscionable).
232. See &L at 266 (allowing recovery based on two contract clauses excluding Westinghouse Liability).
The Tribunal indicated that other legal systems recognized and upheld limitation of liability clauses. dt
233. See id. at [265 (citing American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran) (recognizing that many
legal systems will not give effect to a limitation of liability clause if the breaching party was grossly negligent).
234. See supra 193-233 and accompanying text (focusing several elements that the Tribunal used when
analyzing contract claims).
235. See MoDEL RULES op PRomSSmIoNAL CONDUCr, supra note 145 (endorsing candid advice to clients
although not legally required).
236. See id.
237. See inf& 242-98 and accompanying text (explaining the current state of Iranian financing and insurance
programs, and alternate means of acquiring these resources).
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included to give a practitioner a comprehensive picture of an investment in fran.238
These segments begin by discussing the current availability of insurance and
financing in Iran." They continue by establishing what foreign investors have done
to compensate for Iran's present shortage of financing and insurance.m Finally,
these segments conclude by specifying how Iran is making serious attempts to
rectify these demands in order to supply adequate levels of financing and insurance
to all of its foreign investors. u !
A. Financing the Investment
A host country's ability to support foreign investment is crucial to that
country's capacity to sustain continuous and successful veins of investors within
that nation.2 2 Unfortunately, Iran has been unable to meet these demands expected
of its potentially booming industrial economy for several reasons.2 3 Iran's net
foreign assets have decreased to less than US$6.5 billion in 1997 due to the effects
of Iran's 1980s war with Iraq which contributed to Iran's depressed economy.2
Iran's currency shortage is directly related to its declining oil sales and a national
campaign to distribute money to existing foreign debtors.24 Limited hard currency
holdings have been allocated to foreign enterprises, but only those in support of
state-sponsored projects.24 Until Iran can regain its economic strength and develop
a surplus for foreign investment, foreign investors must rely on their own countries
to finance projects.'





242. See Glain supra note 2 (indicating that Iran's inability to extend credit to investors has frustrated Iran's
attempts to lure foreign investors to Iran). At a recent trade show in Iran, foreign businesses displaying their goods
were disappointed to find that Iran lacks funds to invest in their merchandise. Id; see also Pearl, uprm note I
(stating that the Iranian economy is stagnating and is in desperate need of capital to finance local and foreign
projects).
243. See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text (delineating the reasons for Iran's depressed economy).
244. See Glain, supra note 2 (unofficial estimate by Iranian economics journalist suggesting that Iranian
foreign assets may be down to US$6.5 billion); see also Pearl, supra note 1 (explaining how Iran altered currency
exchange rates during the 1980s which eventually lead to greater budget deficits and higher inflation).
245. See Glain, supra note 2 (maintaining that Iran's number one export, oil products, is down resulting in
a decrease in Iran's currency surplus). Iran has adopted an aggressive campaign to repay foreign debts. Id. Iranian
banks declared imports financed outside the country to be contraband, which further affected foreign investment.
246. See US (stating that a German engineer, who operated a state-run dairy in Iran, suggested that payments
to state businesses may take up to a year).
247. See id. (indicating that foreign investors can deposit 100% of the value of the transaction in a local
Iranian bank which would then use the funds to pay off the seller of the goods).
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Several countries have attempted to increase their economic and political
influence in Iran during the past several months by supporting investments.248
Recently, Italy has opened a US$1.2 billion medium and long-term line of credit for
Italian investment projects in Iran, with an additional US$120 million in short-term
credit.2 9 Italian exports in Iran exceeded US$870 million in 1997, with Italy
reciprocally purchasing US$1.8 billion in Iranian oil products.2 Additionally, Italy
has been interested in encouraging investments in metallurgy, telecommunications,
and petrochemical, and has financed Italian enterprises primarily for these types of
businesses."5 As a result, over eighty Italian businesses have recently embarked on
Iran looking for investments backed by Italian based funding.
252
Other countries have followed Italy's aggressive lead by funding their own
investors. 3 For instance, Belgium's General Bank has provided a US$220 million
line of credit to Iranian banks for Belgian exports of goods to Iran.2m Several other
countries, including Germany2?5 and France, have followed by financing billion
dollar foreign investment projects in Iran. Businesses that have been excluded
from investing in Iran remain to be only U.S. companies prohibited by I.L.S.A.
imposed sanctions.' European companies, on the other hand, are developing solid
248. See Italian Foreign Trade Minister in Iran to Drum up Business, AGENCE FR. PREssE, Oct. 6, 1998
(suggesting that Italy desires to increase its economic presence in Iran).
249. See Trade Fimance a Supplement to Project Finance, Export Finance, Europeans Resume Iranian Credit
Lines, PROJECT&TRADEFIN., Sept. 10, 1998, at 12 [hereinafter Trade Finance] (discussing how the Italian Banks
have extended lines of credit to Italian businesses investing in Iran).
250. See Italian Foreign Trade Minister in Iran to Drum up Business, supra note 248 (explaining that Giorgio
Fossa, president ofemployer's association, was committed to increasing Italian investments in Iran). Italy, as Iran's
second largest trading partner, purchased several billion dollars in oil products from Iran. Id.
251. See id. (declaring that Italy is predominantly interested in Iran's oil industry, but is also willing to pursue
developments in the Iranian telecommunications and steel sector).
252. See id. (claiming that both Iranian and Italian officials are attempting to solidify trade agreements by
making commitments to support investments).
253. See inhor notes 254-56 and accompanying text (listing several foreign business entities that have taken
a recent interest in investing in Iran); see also Germany Loses Out In Iranian Market, HANDEsBLAT, Aug. 4,
1998, at 23 (indicating that Italy, Austria and Switzerland have all increased provisions for exports to Iran during
the last several months).
254. See Trade Finance, supra note 249, at 12 (indicating that Belgian funds are being channeled through
six Iranian banks including Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, Bank Meflat, Bank Sepah, Bank Tejarat, and the Bank of
Industry and Mines). This financing, which has been insured by Belgium's Generale Bank, is intended fora general
purpose to fund Belgian exports to Iran. Id
255. See Germany Loses Out In Iranian Market, supra note 253 (declaring that German investment in Iran
increased by 34% in 1997, which was the largest increase in the past four years). However, Germany may lose out
to other countries on securing its share of Iranian businesses if it does not increase the volume of investment soon.
Id.
256. See Trade Finance a Supplementto Project Finance, Export Finance, Europeans Resume Iranian Credit
Lines, supra note 249 (explaining that France has been the most active country in re-building its trade
links with Iran).
257. See id (stating that U.S. businesses have placed a great deal ofpressure on Congress to remove I.L.S.A.
imposed restrictions).
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business relationships with Iran while promoting growth in the Iranian economy
with foreign based capital s8
Meanwhile, Iran is attempting to raise funds for potential foreign investors and
to create state based incentives for these investmentsY 9 Thus far, Iran has
developed a new national economic policy encouraging an aggressive campaign to
raise money locally. Such projects include promotion of the sale of public bonds
and investments in pension funds.21 Also, Iran has encouraged existing
petrochemical businesses to expand their operations to include sales of shares to the
public.2 Iran has offered incentives to foreign investors by extending tax breaks
and decreased operating costs to businesses working in Iranian Special Trade
Zones.m However, until Iran can effectively reconstruct its financial network,
investors must rely on foreign funding to support their projects.'
In addition to the problems with financing, many investors have been dissuaded
from investing in Iran because of Iran's inability to protect foreign ventures. 20
Some fear that internal problems will occur in Iran, similar to those during the 1979
Revolution, which may result in contractual breaches affecting foreign
businesses.m As a result of Iran's turbulent economic history, 7 many foreign
investors have found the need to protect their investments with national
258. See ki (claiming that U.S. businesses prohibited from investing in Iran due to LLS.A. sanctions
believe that lucrative business opportunities in Iran are being swallowed up by European investors).
259. See infra notes 261-263 and accompanying text; see also Petrochemicals in Iran Catalyst
Needed supra note 130 (proclaiming that Iran has been desperate to make up for low petroleum returns which
were due to decreased oil prices).
260. See Petrochemicals in Iran: Catalyst Needed, supra note 130 (alleging that Iran's deputy oil minister,
Mohammed Reza Nematzadeh, has promised to raise US$12 billion in funds, including some
directly through public investment).
261. See id.
262. See id. (suggesting that "floatation" of shares on the Tehran Stock Exchange may contribute towards
the raising of US$12 billion projected by the Iranian foreign minister).
263. See id. (explaining that in addition to tax breaks, investors would be offered access to feedstock supplies
at below market rates); see also infra note 271 and accompanying text (delineating various Free Trade Zones
established in Iran which provide for special incentives to investors).
264. See Glain, supra note 2 (claiming that Ahmad Mortazavi, director general of Iran's Organization for
Investment, Economic, & Technical Assistance stated that the Iranian government is making every effort to support
investors). Until Iran can provide funding to investors, businesses must continue to rely on their own countries for
economic support. Id.
265. See Petrochemicals in Iran: Catalyst Needed, supra note 130 (suggesting that Iran's ambitious plans
to support foreign investment in Iran have been unsuccessful); see also Glain supra note 2 (indicating
that the Iranian government desires to introduce reforms to facilitate trade and investment in Iran).
266. See Maria Kielmas, Cover For Iran Trade Resumes: European Agencies End Hiatus on Political Risk
Coverage For Iran, Bus. INs., Aug. 10, 1998, at 17 (stating that European companies demand protection for their
investments because of the uncertainty and instability of Iran economically and politically); see also Iran Woos
Foreigners To Invest In Free-Trade Zones, AGENCE FR.-PREssE, Oct. 28, 1998 (specifying measures taken by
Iranian legislation to protect investors from losses occurring from unstable national affairs).
267. See supra notes 17-46 and accompanying text (describing events relating to the Iranian Revolution
which disrupted many investments in the 1970s).
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insurance. 6 But, as with financing, obtaining insurance has been an obstacle to
many foreigners that lack total support from their country of origin.2
B. Protecting the Investment
To lessen these obstacles, the Iranian government made concrete attempts to
provide insurance for its foreign investors.27 The Iranian Parliament urged approval
of legislation that would protect foreign investments in Iran's Free Trade Zones,
including the Gulf Islands of Kish and Qeshm, and the southeastern port of
Shabahar on the Oman Sea.27 1 Further, the proposed bill would protect investors in
the event that another revolution occurred and foreign property was expropriated
by Iranian nationals.27 2 This proposal was a direct response to the demands of
foreign nationals requesting assurances which would protect them against possible
Iranian nationalism27 3 similar to that resulting in the U.S. hostage situation in
1979 274 and the subsequent Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.27 5
In the meantime, some foreign investors have been able to invest in Iran with276
the security of limited insurance from their own countries. The United Kingdom's
Export Credit Guarantee Department has recently resumed US$160 million of short-
term official insurance coverage for United Kingdom (UK) exports to Iran.2-m The
UK has also agreed to discuss restoration of medium-term insurance if the
268. See infra notes 277-93 and accompanying text (explaining foreign efforts to provide insurance to protect
national investments).
269. See Kielmas, supra note 266 (emphasizing that many foreign investors are unwilling to take the risk of
investing in Iran because of Iran's policy toward buying back property). Small business investors are especially
concerned because the Iranian Constitution prohibits any foreign investor from owning any assets in the gas and
oil industry. Id
270. See Glain supra note 2; see also Iran Woos Foreigners To Invest In Free.Trade Zones, supra note 266
(indicating that the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, has attempted to pass measures compensating foreign investors
for losses incurred in case a nationalization drive occurs). But see Petrochemicals in Iran: Catalyst Needed, supra
note 130 (holding that the Council of Guardians in the Iranian Parliament rejected the bill on constitutional grounds
early in 1999).
271. See Iran Woos Foreigners To Invest In Free-Trade Zones, supra note 266 (relaying that Morteza Alvira,
head of Iran's Free Trade Zones Organization, stated that the bill was presented to encourage investments in Free
Trade Zones, as well as, other areas).
272. See id (postulating that the driving force behind the bill was to protect foreign nationals in the case of
a nationalization drive or related legislation).
273. See generally Kielmas, supra note 266 (indicating that investors are ready to make investments once
they receive guarantees for their investments from the Iranian government).
274. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Iranian revolution which culminated
in 1979 with the taking of hostages at the American Embassy in Tehran).
275. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (describing the establishment of the Iran.U.S.
Claims Tribunal).
276. See infra notes 277-93 and accompanying text.
277. See Iran: UK and EU Partners Offer Export Insurance Cover, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Aug. 7,1998,
at 16 (suggesting that the UK resumed short-term insurance for exports to Iran after a four year restriction on
insurance). Beckett stated that resuming insurance was directly related to improved progress in managing the
Iranian economy by President Khatami and his ministers. Id.
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implementation of short-term insurance is well received in Iran. 8 According to the
UK Board of Trade President, Margaret Beckett, the reintroduction of this type of
insurance in Iran will be welcomed by British exporters.279 The insurance will also
indirectly act to improve relations between Iran and the U.K. by encouraging free
trade between the two countries.2
Italy, Iran's second-largest European trading partner, also encouraged
investments in ran by providing Italian nationals with insurance coverage.281 Italy's
Sezione Speciale per IAssicurazione del Credito all'Esportazione or SACE, agreed
to provide insurance to Italian small and medium sized firms.2 2 SACE also agreed
to insure Italy's Mediobanco, a bank that extended a $1.2 billion line of credit to six
of Iran's local banks. 3 Italy's long history of investment with Iran has proven to be
crucial in protecting both Italian and Iranian investments during this time of Iranian
economic growth.'
Germany's Hermes Kreditversicherung, a German insurance company, also
restored insurance coverage to German investors in ran.285 The German insurance
provider agreed to provide a ceiling of $2.8 million short-term coverage for each
project and $16.6 million maximum coverage for each medium-term transaction.2
However, Germany has only agreed to provide insurance coverage if Iran and its
banks can guarantee that Iran's economy is financially stable enough to support
278. See Trade Finance, supra note 249 (maintaining that the UK will not agree to implement a medium-term
insurance policy until it has had a chance to observe the Iranian economy under the political and economic
pressures of decreased oil prices and sales).
279. See Ian Black, British Joins To Woo Tehran As Relations Thaw Iran, GUARDIAN, (London) Sept. 8,
1998, at 12 (explaining how these types of insurance coverage are especially welcomed by British exports,
especially in light of recent developments of improved relations between the United States and Iran); see also UK
and EU Partners Offer Export Insurance Cover, supra note 277 (quoting Beckett in her assessment of the value
of insurance to British businesses investing in Iran).
280. See Iran: UK and EU Partners Offer Export Insurance Cover, supra note 277 (claiming that promotion
of insurance to British exporters will strengthen trade relations with Iran).
281. See infra notes 282-44 and accompanying text.
282. See Kielmas, supra note 266 (explaining how Italy has proposed to restore short-term insurance of 180
days for letters of credit guaranteed by Iranian banks). This proposal comes after several Italian businesses were
working in Iran without any coverage available to them. Id. Medium term insurance will also be restored as
determined on case-by-case basis, if it generates income for the Italian system and helps to develop the Iranian
economy. I
283. See Iran: UK and EU Partners Offer Export Insurance Cover, supra note 277 (listing Iranian banks
which include Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, Bank Meflat, Bank Sepah, Bank Tejarat, and the Bank of Industry &
Mines).
284. See Italian Trade Minister in Iran To Drum Up Business, supra note 248 (stating that Tran's second
largest European trading partner, Italy, has taken several steps to improve relations with Iran and encourage Italian
investment there).
285. See Iran: German Agency Resumes Export Cover, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Aug. 28, 1998, at 10
(indicating that the German government implemented the insurance in July, 1998, however, no German
business have yet taken advantage of the coverage).
286. See i,
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German investments. 7 Despite this coverage, German investors have been hesitant
to make new investments in Iran until Iran provides additional insurance coverage
for their investments.28
Other foreign investors, including the Korea Export Insurance Corp., a Korean
insurer of Hyundai shipbuilders, agreed to provide export insurance to
Iran.2 9 This $350 million contract for the construction of oil tankers between Iran
and Korea was made to protect the investment of Korean firms in case of a default
in payment by the Iranian shipping manufacturers.29 Countries, including
Belgium291 and France,292 have also provided limited insurance to investors from
their countries investing in Iran." 3 However, the general consensus among these
foreign investors is that Iran must do its part by providing its own insurance to
investors.
294
Iran recently attempted to expand its insurance to protect foreign persons by
providing automobile and health insurance to foreigners, but investors are still left
unprotected under most of Iranian insurance policies.295 If Iran wants to become
competitive enough to attract foreign investors, Iran's parliament must pass new
forms of insurance that protect foreign investors and their investments.296 Even
though Iran has made slow progress in affecting change, Iran is still moving in a
287. Id (indicating that Hermes requested a guarantee from the Iranian Economy and Finance Minister
before insurance coverage is provided to German investors in Iran).
288. See Kielmas, supra note 266 (stating that all insurance is subject to approval of a German government
committee and is decided on a case by case basis); see also Iran: German Agency Resumes Export Cover, supra
note 285 (suggesting German investors are cautious about plunging into an investment in Iran). But see Iran and
Europe: The Radicals Regret, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1998, at 51 (stating also that despite Germany's attempts
to restore positive business relations with Iran, tension remained high after Germany was unable to negotiate a trade
with Iran for the return of a German engineer sentenced to death by Iranian courts).
289. See US: $350 Million Export Insurance for Daewoo, Hyundai Contracts, AStA PULSE, Aug. 6, 1998
(indicating that insurance will be provided to support US$350 million in ship building contracts). Daewoo is
scheduled to build five oil tankers at US$46 million each while Hyundai will build four oil tankers at US$30 million
each). Id.
290. See id (explaining that in cases of default by Iran the Korean export insurance will reimburse the
Korean Daewoo and Hyundai Corporations).
291. See Trade Finance, supra note 249 (stating that Office National du Ducroire, the Belgian credit insurer,
will provide coverage to Belgian businesses investing in Iran).
292. See Kielmas, supra note 266 (indicating that Paris based Coface, resumed underwriting insurance for
credit risk in 1996). All coverage provided by Coface is only given once the Iranian banks provide a guarantee).
Id
293. See generally id (affirming that the insurance provided is only for exports from their country of origin
that are investing in Iran with the permission of the State).
294. See id (emphasizing that many foreign insurance providers will not approve the coverage unless Iranian
banks also guarantee the risk).
295. See id
296. See KALEIDOSCOPE, (1998 ABC-CLIO, Inc. Iran) (indicating that lasting improvements in Iran's
economy may require the support of the conservative Islamic faction still firmly situated within the Iranian
government).
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positive direction toward its future.29 Iran has made diligent efforts to provide a
hospitable environment for its investors while being receptive to the plethora of
investors that have embarked on Iran thus far.28
VI. CONCLUSION
As one of the last investment frontiers, Iran and other friendly countries in the
Middle East, are ideal for investment.299 Investors will find that there is much to be
gained from venturing into Iran during this time of economic growthmo Iran's rich
oil reserves, 3°' shortage of goods," 2 and new policy toward Western nationsm3 make
it a suitable time to plan an investment in Iran. 4 If relations with Iran continue to
improve, international practitioners must be thoroughly prepared to successfully
plan these transactions.30 An understanding of Iran's history,306 economy," 7 and
availability of insurance and financing 308 will make present investment plans in Iran
much more feasible.' While these considerations are invaluable, the most crucial
297. See Burns, supra note 115 (stating that Iran is moving toward reconciliation between itself and the
West); see also Clinton: Let's Renew Friendship With Iran supra note 5 (specifying that President Clinton believes
that good relations between the United States and Iran can be restored).
298. See Iran Woos Foreigners To Invest In Free-Trade Zones, supra note 266 (outlining how the Iranian
parliament has attempted to create tax and other incentives for investors willing to invest in Iran's specially
designated Free Trade Zones). Iranian Parliament also attempted to pass legislation to increase insurance coverage
to foreign investors. It
299. See Hamilton, supra note 97, at 18 (emphasizing that the potential for investment in all oil rich
countries can not be ignored by the West).
300. See Political Outlook, supra note 2 (suggesting that foreign relations have undergone considerable
changes in the past twelve months since President Khatami was elected in May 1997); see also Iran: Relief On
Debts Sought, Despite Fall in Value, supra note 105 (stating that foreign debts in Iran fell by US$800 million
during the first quarter of 1998).
301. See U.S. Isolated in Policy of Trying to Isolate Iran, supra note 90 (claiming that Iran possesses
the world's second largest natural gas reserves).
302. See Glain, supra note 2 (delineating Iran's shortage of goods and need of services); see also supra notes
147-54 and accompanying text (suggesting that Iran's agricultural equipment has aged over the past two
decades giving Iran a dire need for replacement parts).
303. See supra notes 110-36 and accompanying text (describing the recent developments between Iran
and the United States that have resulted in improved foreign policies between the two countries).
304. See China: West Offers Olive Branch to Irn, supra note 5 (repeating a statement from French Foreign
Minister, Vedrine Hudert reiterating the indispensable importance of Iran to the region); see also Political Outlook,
supra note 2 (indicating that the outside world is responding to policy changes within Iran).
305. See MODEL RULES OF PRFoFrssoNAL CONDUCT, supra note 145 (outlining the role of an attorney as
legal, as well as economic advocate for his clients).
306. See supra notes 17-52 and accompanying text (discussing the rise and "fall" of the Iranian government
during the 1960s through late 1970s).
307. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (expressing explicit business dealings taking place
between Iran and the United States during the 1970s).
308. See supra notes 242-95 and accompanying text (explaining insurance and financing options currently
available in Iran).
309. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr, supra note 145 (advocating political, economic, and
moral advice to one's client).
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factor to the practitioner may be an awareness of the law which applies to the
contractual agreement.
310
In this regard, the outcome of the Iran-U.S. Tribunal decisions on past
investments in Iran will be consequential to a favorable outcome of a transnational
business transaction in Iran's future.31 Even though the Tribunal decisions are not
stare decisis or binding precedent,312 the decisions may be argued to apply to
potential disputes similar to those heard by the Tribunal. 13 An analysis of the
Tribunal decisions will help a practitioner plan for several contingencies that may
occur in an investment in Iran.314 This may include the possibility of force majeure
or frustration of the purpose of the contact,3ls breach of contract,316 and the
deference given to contractual terms by the Tribunal regarding settling disputes
arising by either party.317 Accordingly, the decisions of the Tribunal can be used as
an indispensable tool for planning a successful investment in Iran during its new era
of economic development
318
310. See BORN, supra note 142, at 24 (stating the need to devise a well-planned conflict of law provision
within a transnational contract).
311. See Caron, supra note 4, at 156 n.3 (citing HOLTZMANN, SOME LESSONS OFTHEIRAN-UNITED STArES
CLAIMSThIBUNAL: PRivATEINVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS ANDSOLUTnONS N INTERNATIONALBUSINESS, at 16)
(indicating that the Tribunal's decisions are cited in the Restatement Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States).
312. See BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 5, at 669 (proclaiming the Tribunal's precedential value to
internationally accepted principals of commercial law).
313. Id. (emphasizing the Tribunal's significance to transnational investments).
314. Id. (postulating that the impact of the Tribunal decisions will be the most significant body of case law
directed at international arbitration). But see Caron, supra note 4, at 156 nA (citing M. SORNARmAH, TiE PURSUfT
OF NATIONALIZED PROPERITY 202 (1986) (questioning the value of the Tribunal decisions because of its purely
political nature).
315. See supra notes 193-204 and accompanying text (explaining the outcome of contractual disputes arising
from the Iranian Revolution taking place between 1978-79).
316. See supra notes 217-34 and accompanying text (discussing causes of action resulting from events other
than force majeure).
317. See supra notes 205-16 and accompanying text (describing the major areas in which the Tribunal
has distinguished cases in favor of either party based on analysis of the terms of the contract and the actions of the
parties prior and subsequent to a contractual breach).
318. See Lillich and Bederman, supra note 135, at 463 (postulating that the decisions of the Tribunal may
be a valuable source of opinion to the law of international claims).
